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ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM: LESSONS FROM
THE OIL FIRES OF KUWAIT
Jesica E. Seacor
INTRODUCTION
Eyewitnesses to the inferno on the Kuwaiti oil fields at the end of the
Persian Gulf War' described the scene as "hell on earth."' Over seven
hundred oil wells burned uncontrollably for eight months until a multi-
national coalition of firefighters extinguished the last oil well fire? The
* J.D. 1994, Washington College of Law, The American University; A.B. 1989,
College of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown University. A former editor-in-chief of The
American University Journal of International Lznv and Policy, the author would like
to thank the members of the Journal for their assistance and patience throughout the
extended life of this Comment. The author is currently an associate with Kilpatrick &
Cody in Washington, D.C.
1. See William M. Arkin, The Gulf 'Hypenar--An Interim Tally, N.Y. TIMtES,
June 22, 1991, at 23 (noting the impact of the Gulf War). The Persian Gulf War
began on January 16, 1991, and officially ended on March 1, 1991, six weeks later.
let The United States and a United Nations (U.N.) coalition of forces, collectively the
Allied forces, fought against Iraq after it invaded Kuwait, a neighbor at its southern
border. Id.
2. See infra part II (detailing events of the Persian Gulf War involving envi-
ronmental destruction); see, e.g., HELL ON EARTH: THE KLvArrl OIL FIREs (Arts &
Entertainment Network 1991) [hereinafter HELL ON EARTH] (depicting firefighting
techniques employed by United States and Canadian teams to extinguish the blazes);
Sebastio Salgado, The Kuwaiti Inferno: A Photo Essay. N.Y. Timis, June 9, 1991, §
6 (Magazine), at 21 (portraying photographs of the fies and the firefighters who
battled them).
3. HELL ON EARTH, supra note 2. Although the estimated number of oil wells
damaged by the fires ranged from 500 to 900, the official count by firefighters was
732. Id; infra note 63 (providing the widest range of estimated oil fires); see lVorld
News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 7. 1991) (inter-
viewing firefighters putting out the last oil well fire). Firefighters extinguished the
fires on November 6, 1991, many months earlier than firefighting experts had predict-
ed. Id. Red Adair, a legendary oil well firefighter whose company was one of the
U.S. teams hired by the Kuwaiti government to stamp out the blazes, testified before
the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee [hereinafter Senate Coin-
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retreating Iraqi troops had deliberately set the wells ablaze. 4 Simulta-
neous media coverage of the event grimly reminded Western nations of
their continuing dependence on oil from the Middle East.'
The oil fires also signified a more menacing threat: their lasting im-
pact on the environment and population of the region could not be
measured.6 While the cost of the firefighting alone reached $2 billion,
the personal cost to civilians, military personnel, and firefighters affected
by exposure to the oil fires and polluted air is still being calculated.7
mittee] that the task would take up to five years to complete. See also Kuwait Oil
Fires: Hearing of the Gulf Environmental Task Force of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (statement of Paul "Red" Adair,
The Red Adair Co.), FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Hearings 1]; FIRES OF KUWAIT (IMAX 1992)
(documenting the firefighters, including Red Adair's team, struggling to put out the
blazes amid the bleak desert landscape).
4. See Jennifer Parmalee, Kuwaiti Emir Snuffs Out Last Iraqi-Lit Oil Fire,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, at Al (indicating that retreating Iraqi troops intentionally
set the oil well fires).
5. See THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER (Majestic
Communications Ltd. & MICO 1993) (chronicling the rise of the U.S. oil industry
and factors leading to Western dependence on foreign oil, particularly from the Mid-
dle East). The documentary is based on the novel by Daniel Yergin. DANIEL YEROIN,
THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER (1991). Some commenta-
tors believe, though, that the West's dependence on foreign oil will decrease in the
future as oil becomes less critical to industrialized economies, and solar power and
nuclear fusion become more important. Bruce W. Nelan, How the World Will Look in
50 Years, TIME, Fall 1992, at 36. Others, like Yergin, assert that oil will continue to
dominate the industry until a breakthrough occurs, that will meet both energy and
environmental demands. Daniel Yergin, Clinton's Oil Policy Will Cater to Environ-
ment, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 14, 1993, at A21.
6. See THE MEDIA AND THE GULF WAR (Hedrick Smith ed., 1992) (discussing
censorship of Gulf War data and uncertainty concerning the veracity of available in-
formation); infra part III (detailing censorship of information). For a graphic firsthand
account of the environmental impact of the war, see JASSIM MOHAMMAD AL-HASSAN,
THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, AN ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHE (2d prtg. 1992).
7. See John Horgan, Up in Flames: Kuwait's Burning Oil Wells Are a Sad Test
of Theories, ScI. AM., May 1991, at 17 [hereinafter Horgan, Up in Flames] (discuss-
ing views of international scientists collecting data on the impact of the conflagra-
tion); John Horgan, Burning Questions: Scientists Launch Studies of Kuwait's Oil
Fires, ScI. AM., July 1991, at 17 [hereinafter Horgan, Burning Questions] (focusing
on various computer models for predicting effects of oil well fires on decreases in
solar radiation and total soot fallout). Initial reports assessing the extent of damage
caused by the burning Kuwaiti oil wells predicted that the smoke plumes would have
a global impact, contributing to acid rain, global warming, and ozone depletion.
Horgan, Up in Flames, supra. Later reports, however, claimed that the fires had not
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What appears certain, though, is the recognition that the environment
and population in the region suffered senselessly for the sake of human
politics!
To better understand the Persian Gulf War in the context of its envi-
ronmental impact, this Comment studies the environmental effects of the
war and recommends under international law a course of action to pre-
vent this type of "environmental terrorism" from recurring.' Part I pro-
vides an overview of the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's bombing of Kuwait's
oil facilities, and the setting of the oil well fires. Part II analyzes data
on the human and environmental impact of the oil fires and related oil
spills. Part m suggests the reasons for the U.S. government's gag order
restricting publication of some of the information relating to the extent
of the war's impact.' Part IV prescribes recommendations under inter-
had the global environmental impact earlier feared. See, e.g., Kuiwait Oil Fires Had
No Global Effect on Atmosphere, World Weather Agency Says, 15 Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA) No. 12, at 412 (June 17, 1992) (recapping a World Meteorological Organiza-
tion finding that the impact was severe in Persian Gulf region but only short-term);
Bill Dietrich, Kuwait's Oil Fires Caused Little Damage, GAZETFE (Montreal), May 17,
1992, at B6 (interviewing a scientist studying unfounded "nuclear winter" concern);
Effects of Oil Fires in Kuwait Still Inconclusive, Panel Says, 14 Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA) No. 21, at 576 (Oct. 23, 1991) (discussing conclusions of the Senate Commit-
tee task force which downplayed the health effects of the fires).
Although the inferno's impact is no longer considered to be global, the regional
impact continues to be dire. See Matthew L. Wald, No Global Threat Seen From Oil
Fires, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1991, at C5 (confirming that the oil fires were causing
substantial regional environmental changes).
8. A report issued by the Arab Monetary Fund estimated that the war cost the
region $676 billion in 1990 and 1991, excluding figures measuring the damage to the
environment and economies of the region. Youssef M. Ibrahim. War Is Said to Cost
the Persian Gulf $676 Billion in 1990 and '91, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1993. at 14.
9. See Millions of Gallons of Crude Oil Flow into Persian Gulf from Kuwaiti
Tanks, 14 Int'l Envtl Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) No. 2. at 37 (Jan. 30, 1991) [herein-
after Millions of Gallons] (noting that a Pentagon official called the Gulf spill "an act
of environmental terrorism"); U.S. Trade Mission Pushes Debt-Nature Swaps, 14 Int'l
Env't Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 377 (July 3. 1991) (stating that Interna-
tional Green Cross called Hussein's acts "ecological terrorism"); see also Steven Em-
erson, When Earth Takes the Hit, 21 Int'l Wildlife 38 (1991) (labeling Iraq's actions
as "environmental terrorism"). The terms "environmental terrorism." "ecological terror-
ism," and "ecocide" were coined by various groups to describe Iraq's method of war-
fare. Id.
10. See John Horgan, U.S. Gags Discussion of War's Environmental Effects. Sl.
AM., May 1991, at 24 (discussing the existence of a gag order). Among other
agencies, the U.S. Department of Energy ordered its facilities and contractors to dis-
continue discussion of "war-related research and issues" with the media: "Most inde-
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national law to punish willful violators of the law, whether the perpetra-
tors are individuals or governments, and to deter such deliberate envi-
ronmental destruction from recurring.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the neighboring
nation of Kuwait." Iraq's President Saddam Hussein apparently wanted
to seize control over Kuwait primarily due to its oil pricing, production
and sales. 2 Kuwait's unwillingness to raise its oil prices in the world
market may have triggered Iraq to attack.' In addition, Iraq was strug-
gling to pay off its lingering debt from the 1980-88 war with Iran. 4
Finally, President Hussein believed that because Kuwait had been situat-
ed historically within Iraq's borders, Iraq was entitled to Kuwait's oil
resources and revenues.'
5
pendent studies and experts suggest that the catastrophic predictions in some recent
news reports are exaggerated. We are currently reviewing the matter, but these predic-
tions remain speculative and do not warrant any further comment at this time." Id.;
see infra part III (discussing the reasons behind the gag order, including national
security interests and inconclusiveness of data).
11. See Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce
Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al (describing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).
The invasion began at 2:00 a.m. when over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers crossed the Iraq-
Kuwait border. Id. By mid-morning, Kuwait City, located 80 miles south of the bor-
der, was occupied in a "lightning-like" conquest. Walter V. Robinson, Iraq Tightens
Its Control Over Kuwait; 'Revolutionary' Regime Installed; Arab Leaders Withhold
Criticism; The Invasion of Kuwait, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1990, at I; see also
WILLIAM M. ARKIN ET AL., GREENPEACE, ON IMPACT 25 (1991) (detailing events at
the outbreak of Persian Gulf War).
12. See Gordon, supra note 11, at Al (noting reluctance by Kuwait to reduce oil
production so that Iraq's sales revenues would improve internationally).
13. See Zedalis, infra note 15, at 712 (linking the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to
Iraq's dropping oil sales). For a concise analysis of the relevance of the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait to the global oil market, see YERGIN, supra note 5, at 769-81.
14. See Zedalis, infra note 15, at 712 (noting that Kuwait's oil revenues would
help Iraq address its war debt).
15. See Gerald F. Seib, Iraq Has Shaky Claim to Kuwait, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
1990, at 5 (articulating Iraq's historical claim to portions of Kuwait considered to be
its own); Roger Vielvoye, Kuwait-Iraq Border Dispute, 88 OIL & GAS J. 32 (1990)
(focusing on Iraq's interest in oil near Kuwait border). Another source mentioned
Iraq's possible aspirations towards Saudi Arabia as well. Rex J. Zedalis, Burning of
the Kuwaiti Oilfields and the Laws of War, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 712
(1991); see also YERGIN, supra note 5, at 771-72 (1991) (tracing the historical ten-
sions between Iraq and Kuwait, especially after the discovery of oil in the Gulf re-
484 [VOL. 10: 1
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM 485
The United Nations closely monitored the Iraqi occupation of Ku-
wait. 6 Between the August 2, 1990 invasion and the end of November
1990, the U.N. Security Council drafted a series of resolutions mandat-
ing the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 7 On
December 3, 1990, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 678,
authorizing member states to employ the necessary means to uphold the
previous resolutions if Iraq continued to disobey them."
The deadline for withdrawal expired on January 15, 1991."' The next
day, an allied coalition of military forces from thirty-four nations initiat-
ed Operation Desert Storm with U.N. authorization to use force against
Iraq for its failure to comply with the withdrawal order.' Within a
week, intense and unprecedented bombing by the coalition forces
maimed the massive Iraqi army."
gion).
After the war ended, the U.N. established a new border between Iraq and Ku-
wait, providing Kuwait with ten new oil wells and a former Iraqi naval base. Iraq
Lawmakers Reject New UN-Drawn Kuwait Border, CHL TRMB., May 21. 1992, at 4.
Iraq condemned the U.N. for violating international law by establishing the demilita-
rized border zone. Chris Hedges, After 'Confusion' Iraq Frees U.S. Munitions Expert,
N.Y. TIEs, Oct. 11, 1992, at 12 (describing release of American captured at Iraq-
Kuwait border).
Four years after the invasion, Iraq finally has recognized Kuwait's sovereignty.
See Julia Preston, Iraq Accepts Sovereignty of Kuwait, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1994.
at Al (speculating that the action was motivated by Iraq's desire to hasten the lifting
of its U.N. sanctions). The sanctions have crippled Iraq's economy. Caryle Murphy, In
Iraq, 'Every Day Worse Than the Day Before', WASH. POST, July 24, 1994, at Al
(describing the devastating impact the sanctions have had on the daily life of Iraqis).
16. See Zedalis, supra note 15, at 712-13 (discussing role of U.N. Security Coun-
cil and its resolution with regard to the Iraqi invasion).
17. See 1& at 713 n.4 (listing U.N. resolutions penalizing Iraq for failing to with-
draw its forces from Kuwait). The U.N. Security Council resolutions also imposed a
trade embargo on Iraq, scorned Iraq's mistreatment of civilians, and condemned Iraq's
diplomatic violations. Ild. at 713.
18. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doec. S/Res/678 (1990). re-
printed in 1 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1990. at 298.
19. See Zedalis, supra note 15, at 713 (indicating withdrawal order's deadline).
20. See Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf. The Overview, U.S. and Allies Open
Air War on Iraq; Bomb Baghdad and Kuwait Targets; No 'Choice' but Force, Bush
Declares, N.Y. TI, Es, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al (summarizing events leading to U.S.
involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis).
21. See ARKIN Er AL., supra note 11, at 26 (quoting Gen. Carl E. Vuono, Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mar. 19, 1991).
Arkin provides a detailed description of the execution of the four phases of the battle
plan, which concluded in forty-three days. Ld. at 25-39. The air campaign, the key
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In ret liation, however, the Iraqi forces launched an attack on the
environment of the Persian Gulf that some suggest was a foreseeable
disaster.' Saddam Hussein's apparent motive was to deter an allied
invasion of Kuwait by air, land, and water.' Iraqi forces bombed one
of the largest Kuwaiti oil fields near the Saudi Arabian border, two
major mainland refineries, an offshore loading terminal, and anchored
tankers. 4
By late January 1991, Iraq pumped several million barrels of oil into
the Persian Gulf from supply lines between the refineries and an off-
shore terminal, creating a slick at least nine miles long.' The spill im-
component to the allied strategy, was unprecedented in terms of its lethality, preci-
sion, and intensity. Id. at 29.
As a result of the air assault, tens of thousands of unexploded munitions, par-
ticularly cluster' bomblets, lay partially exposed on the desert floor and beneath the
residual oil lakes formed by the damaged Kuwaiti oil wells. Chris Hedges, With a
Bang! Bang! Bang! War Clean Up Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at A4.
22. See Millions of Gallons, supra note 9, at 37 (reporting on widespread envi-
ronmental destruction of wildlife due to oil spills and fires). Some commentators re-
ported that Saddam Hussein had threatened to ignite Kuwaiti oil wells, "flush"
Kuwaiti oil into the Persian Gulf, and destroy desalination plants supplying fresh
water to Saudi Arabia as early as September 1990, five months before he took action.
Tom Wicker, In the Nation; Smoke over Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at 21
(chronicling the effects of burning oil wells); R.W. Apple Jr., War in the Gulf; U.S.
Says Iraq Pumps Kuwaiti Oil into Guf; Vast Damage Feared from Growing Slick,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at 1 (describing extent of oil spill's impact).
23. See Millions of Gallons, supra note 9, at 37 (noting that Iraqi forces deliber-
ately dumped crude oil into the Persian Gulf in an apparent effort to hamper allied
forces actions).
24. See Kuwaiti Oil Field, Refineries Ablaze, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 23, 1991, at
Al (describing the Al-Wafra oil field fire). Texaco managed the AI-Wafra, which was
producing 135,000 barrels of oil daily prior to the Iraqi invasion. Id.; see also Philip
Shenon, War In the Gulf. The Overview; Iraq Sets Oil Companies Afire as Allies
Step Up Air Attacks; Missiles Pierces Tel Aviv Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1991, at
Al, A4 (noting that Mina Abdullah and Shuaiba are two of Kuwait's largest refiner-
ies). The oil flowed into the Gulf from two primary sources: tankers anchored south
of Kuwait City at Mina al-Ahmadi, and from the Sea Island Terminal, a nearby off-
shore loading dock. R.W. Apple Jr., supra note 22, at 1; cf. Saddam's War on the
Gulfs Environment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at A6 (citing third source of spill at
Iraqi facility in Gulf's far northwestern comer). This source was not made public due
to U.S. efforts to make Iraq appear solely responsible for the environmental destruc-
tion caused by the war. Horgan, supra note 10, at 24. Instead, the United States as-
serted that its bombing of Kuwaiti oil facilities was an attempt to stop the flow of
oil into the waters of the Gulf. Shenon, supra; see also infra part III (discussing the
suppression of information relating to the war's impact).
25. See Robert D. McFadden, War in the Gulf- The Environment; Oil Threatens
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mediately affected the wildlife in the region, including migratory birds
and sea turtles.' Moreover, the spill contaminated the fresh water sup-
ply to Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia provided by desalination facili-
tiesY The burning oil facilities and Gulf spill captured worldwide me-
dia attention and prompted grave concern for the environmental conse-
quences.' Nevertheless, Iraqi troops continued to attack Kuwait's oil
fields as the forces retreated, igniting oil wells and facilities at several
hundred locations.29 By the end of February, the troops had surren-
dered.3
Although the war officially ended on March 1, 1991, concluding
forty-three days of technologically sophisticated "hyperwar,"'' the re-
Fishing and Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at I (noting Gulf s oil slick).
Scientists estimated that the spill equaled ten million barrels of oil covering 350
square miles by January 30, 1991. Millions of Gallons, supra note 9. at 37. This is
approximately twenty-five times the size of the Exron-Valdez oil spill. Id. at 37. Over
250,000 barrels spilled in Prince William Sound in the 1989 Exxon tanker accident
off the coast of Alaska. Anne Mcllroy, Oil is Everywhere in Kuin'ait; After the 8-
Month Inferno, There Are 252 Oil Lakes, Many Covering Suspected Mine Fields, GA-
ZTrm (Montreal), Dec. 7, 1991, at K6.
26. See GREENPEACE, THE ENVmONMrNTAL LEGACY OF THE GULF WAR (giving
a thorough report on the war's impact on the Gulf coast, air quality, marine mam-
mals, turtle population, and coral reef).
27. See Alan Crowell, The World; More Precious Than Oil, and Maybe as Vola-
tile, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, § 4, at 3 (commenting on scarcity of water in re-
gion). Iraqi forces destroyed Kuwait's desalination plants, drastically affecting the fresh
water supply for eastern Saudi Arabia, coalition military personnel, and Kuwaiti civil-
ians. Id.; see also part ll.D. of this Comment (discussing water issues in the Gulf).
28. See, e.g., R.W. Apple Jr., Relentless Tide of Oil Fouls Shores of Empty
Saudi City, N.Y. TiaES, Jan. 28, 1991, at Al (noting the oil slick's effect on the
Saudi Arabian shoreline); John Holusha, U.S. Companies to Join Bid to Minimize Gulf
Oil Spill, N.Y. TMIEs, Jan. 29, 1991, at All (indicating that U.S. companies were
supporting Gulf environmental clean up efforts); John Holusha, War's Hazards for
Environment are Assessed, N.Y. TmEs, Jan. 24, 1991, at D6 (recognizing the massive
destruction to the region's environment caused by munitions, oil fires and spills).
29. See R.W. Apple Jr., Record Number of Raids Flown Over Kmnvait - Iraqis
Burn Wells, N.Y. TamFs, Feb. 23, 1991, at Al (mentioning the facilities attacked).
30. See Carol Morello, For Many Soldiers, A Bumper-to-Bumper War, PHILADEL-
PltA INQUIRER, Mar. 3, 1991, at 1 (describing Iraqi forces surrendering in droves).
For pool reporters' descriptions of the conditions of Iraqi troops surrendering, see
ARKIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 34-37.
31. See Arkin, supra note 1, at 23 (describing intensity of the warfare). Pentagon
officials coined "hyperwar" to describe the modem, rapid, and technologically devas-
tating battle plan. Id. More Iraqis died in the Gulf *war than during the eight-year
conflict against Iran. See DILTP Huto, THE LONGEST WAR: THE IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY
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treating Iraqis' final act of igniting hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells re-
mains the most enduring legacy of the war.32 As the fires consumed
ten percent of the world's daily oil ration each day,33 environmental
concerns heightened.' This final act, coupled with the oil spills and
earlier fires, galvanized the international community to respond to the
deliberate destruction of the Persian Gulf environment."a
Before turning to the international legal implications of Iraq's environ-
mental assault, the following sections focus on the range of the environ-
mental destruction. Part II deals specifically with the widespread impact
of the oil fires.
II. THE KUWAITI OIL FIRES
This section addresses the oil well fires, related oil spill hazards, and
the resulting air and water pollution's threat to human health. Although
most of the oil fires were lit after the war had officially ended, their
effect on the environment lingers.36
CoNFLicr 250 (1991) (estimating total war dead at 367,000: 262,000 Iranians, 105,000
Iraqis). For exact figures on casualties tolled, including Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraq
after the Gulf war ended, see ARKIN Er AL., supra note 11, at 42-44.
32. See Wicker, supra note 22, at 21 (noting that post-war destruction is slowly
being remedied); see also HAWLEY, supra note 8 (discussing the Persian Gulf War
and the region's lingering environmental devastation).
33. See Daphne Bramham, Fires of War Continue to Take Toll, CALGARY HER-
ALD, July 23, 1991, at A5 (noting oil lost to the fires). An estimated five to six
million barrels of oil per day burned as a result of the oil well fires. Id. In the Unit-
ed States, automobiles utilize 6.7 million barrels of oil daily. GREEPEACE, supra note
26, at 38. This is 10% of the world's daily oil ration. Id. (quoting James Leggett,
Environmental Responsibilities in the Oil and Gas Industry: A View from the Envi-
ronmental Movement (Nov. 11, 1991) (paper for first International Conference on
Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, The
Hague, Netherlands)). In addition, Kuwait lost $90 million worth of oil per day.
Saddam Hussein's Inferno, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1991, § 4, at 16.
34. See Michael Ross, Experts Blame Saudis, Kuwaitis As Spill, Oil Fires Go
Unchecked, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at A10 (calculating the impact of "the worst
man-made environmental disaster in history").
35. See, e.g., Commission Announces $20 Million Plan to Help Fight Pollution in
Persian Gulf, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep (BNA) No. 8, at 222 (Apr. 24, 1991) (detailing the
European Community's plan to provide training for clean-up and firefighting assis-
tance). The United States, Canada, and the International Maritime Organization, among
others, also contributed to the clean-up effort. Katherine M. Kelly, Declaring War on
the Environment: The Failure of International Environmental Treaties During the Per-
sian Gulf War, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 921, 937 (1992).
36. See Wald, supra note 7, at C5 (confirming that the fires' regional impact
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A. THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE
Six days after the ceasefire, Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to set
fire to the Kuwaiti oil fields.37 Characterized as insane vindictiveness,
Hussein's last command was his most desperate. ' Of the 732 oil wells
ignited, half were located in the Greater Burgan oil fields, the world's
second largest oil reserve.39 Iraqi troops torched the wells and blasted
the valves that could normally choke the oil flow to the wellhead.°
continues to be dire).
37. See Parmalee, supra note 4, at Al (stating that Iraqi troops deliberately set
the oil fires as they retreated); see also Kelly, supra note 35. at 948 (suggesting oil
fires are both offensive and defensive tactics).
38. Saddam Hussein's Inferno, supra note 33, at 16 (calling decision to ignite oil
wells "an act of insane vindictiveness). Hussein was not the first ruler, however, to
sabotage oil fields in battle. YERGIN, supra note 5. at 131. During the first Russian
revolution in 1905, Tatars revolted in Baku against Armenians. destroying their prop-
erty, including oil derricks. Id One witness wrote, "The flames from the burning der-
ricks and oil wells leaped up into the awful pall of smoke which hung over the
inferno. I realized for the first time in my life all that can possibly be meant by
words 'Hell let loose."' Id. In 1916, the British, under the direction of Col. John
Norton-Griffiths, M.P. (a.k.a. Hell-fire Jack and Empire Jack), set out to destroy
Romania's oil industry. Id at 179-82.
39. See John H. Cushman Jr., Environmental Toll Mounting in Kuvait As Oil
Fires Burn On, N.Y. TilEs, June 25, 1991, at C4 (providing a map of the locations
of burning Kuwaiti oil fields, including Al Burgan, located in Kuwait's southeastern
comer). The world's largest oil reservoir is beneath Siberia in the former Soviet Un-
ion (the U.S.S.R.). Id. at 773. In 1989, the U.S.S.R., the world's largest producer and
second largest exporter, more than doubled the oil output of Saudi Arabia. the
world's largest exporter. ld. If the republics of the former Soviet Union realize the
tremendous oil and natural gas potential of the region, the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) will probably lose its strong grip on the world's oil
market. l; see also Hobart Rowen, Dying OPEC Not the Nightmare It Was. HOUS-
TON CHRON., Jan. 7. 1993, at BIO (explaining OPEC's current struggle for control
over its members' and other oil producing countries' production and pricing).
40. Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 17. The flow of oil up to the well-
head exceeded the "prewar capacity," due to explosions that rendered the valves regu-
lating the flow useless. Id. The pipes to the control valves are greater in diameter
than the pipes to the wellhead. Frank Bamaby, Kuwait: A Burning Question Remains
Concerning Environmental Effects of the Gulf War, GUARDIAN, Mar. 8. 1991, at 29.
When Iraqi placed mines blew up the control valves, the oil flowed at an even faster
rate than normal. Id. Iraqi troops also constructed a pipeline to pump oil directly into
the Gulf to avoid an allied invasion. FIRES OF KtvArr, supra note 3. Coalition forc-
es bombed the pipeline, however, to stop the flow of oil. Id. Philip Shenon. U.S.
Bombs Kuwait Oil Stations, Seeking to Cut Flow into Gulf; More Iraqi Planes Fly to
490 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 10:1
Some of the wellheads gushed without igniting to create lakes of oil,
from a few inches deep to three to four feet deep and seven miles
long.4' The oil lakes threatened the underground fresh water supply
4
and lured migratory birds to their deaths.43 Beneath the oil lakes were
mines, laid by retreating Iraqi soldiers, and unexploded munitions to that
hampered the firefighters and subsequent cleanup efforts in the desert."
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at 1.
41. See Kuwait Oil Fires: Hearing of the Gulf Environmental Task Force of the
Senate Environment and Public Works Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (statement
of Henry Kendall, Union of Concerned Scientists), FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 11,
1991, available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Hearings II]
(describing the oil fires' impact on the desert landscape).
42. See Christine Hauser, Gulf Water Resources More Precious than Oil in Arid
GCC States, INTER PRESS SERVICE., Apr. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Li-
brary, INPRES File (discussing threat posed by oil lakes). Oil lakes covered at least
60% of the desert terrain, killing vegetation and posing a serious threat to the under-
ground water supply of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E). Id. Because fresh water is
such a critical issue for the region, the U.N. expects water sharing to lead to future
wars. Id. Currently, the U.A.E. has allocated $137 million for a new desalination fa-
cility and $900 million for other electricity and water projects, while Bahrain has set
aside $196 million for a new desalination facility and utilities projects. Id.
43. See Samia Nakoul, Oil Lakes in Kuwait are Traps for Birds, INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 10, 1991, at 12 (estimating that 20,000 to 30,000 sea birds were trapped in oil
after mistaking the shiny surface of oil lakes for water); Bramham, supra note 33, at
A5 (describing the fate of birds in the region). Thousands of birds died as a result of
flying through the toxic clouds, blinded by toxins, unable to find food, and thus
starving to death. Id.
44. See Ron Martz, Mines Pose Hidden Danger in Kuwait; Oil Fires Hamper
Desert Cleanup, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 15, 1991, at A21 (noting the dangers
of clean up efforts). The Kuwaiti government divided up the country into six sectors
and contracted with various coalition nations for the cleanup of over 10,000 Iraqi land
mines, 1,000 lb. bombs, unexploded artillery shells, and cluster bomblets the size of
baseballs. Id. The nations engaged in the cleanup, the United States, Bangladesh, Brit-
ain, Egypt, France, Pakistan, and Turkey, operate under two to three year contracts
with Kuwait totalling $1 billion worth of business. Hedges, supra note 21, at A4. The
United States sector, located in southeastern Kuwait, contains an estimated 500,000
mines, hundreds of tank wreckages, and oil lakes, making the 1,200 square mile sec-
tor one of the most difficult to handle. Martz, supra, at A21. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the long-term damage sustained by the Kuwaiti desert, see Constance Holden,
Kuwait's Unjust Deserts: Damage to Its Desert, Sci., Mar. 8, 1991, at 1175; see also
Randy Lee Loftis, Weighing the Damages of War, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 17, 1991, at
A23 (noting overlooked impact of Gulf war on desert); Cushman, supra note 39, at
C4 (asserting damage to healthy desert was very severe and yet underreported because
desert is not populated).
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B. AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH
The blazing wellheads generated a smoke plume reaching at least
22,000 feet into the atmosphere45 and initially stretching over 800
miles" to blacken the skies over the region. Early reports indicated that
because of the rapidity with which the smoke was rising' and the
45. See Horgan, Burning Questions, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing controversy
among researchers over how high the plumes actually reached). A British team of
observers concluded that the smoke did not go far above 5.000 meters. while scien-
tists in Hawaii and Wyoming independently found "spikes" of soot at higher levels in
the troposphere. Id. The most critical concern was that the smoke would break into
the stratosphere, which begins at 35,000 feet in the Persian Gulf region, and circulate
around the globe. Wald, supra note 7, at CS; Peter Warren, Kuwait: The Secrecy Sur-
rounding Ecological Damage in the Gulf, GUARDIAN, Aug. 2, 1991, at 27; William
Booth, Fires in Kuwait Not a Threat to Global Climate, Federal Stud, Finds. WASH.
POST, June 25, 1991, at A3. Once in the stratosphere, the tiny particulates would be
dispersed irretrievably, whereas in the lower atmospheric layers, natural processes,
such as rain, would rinse them from the skies. Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7,
at 24. Water vapor in the atmosphere attracts the oily particulates from the oil fires,
preventing an accumulation of pollutants including two million tons of carbon dioxide
and 5,000 tons of soot, that spew into the air each day the fires continued to burn.
Warren, supra (citing a study conducted by the National Science Foundation involving
thirty-five research flights monitoring oil well fires).
46. See Wald, supra note 7, at C5 (detailing the regional environmental impact
of the oil fires). If the smoke plume were superimposed over a map of the United
States, with the oil fires originating in an area the size of Manhattan, the plume
would cover Florida and stretch several hundred miles wide. Id. A Seattle scientist
noted that the amount of soot rising out of the fires was equal to 46 million heavy-
duty diesel trucks going about thirty miles an hour. Robert Cooke, Hell on Earth,
NEWSDAY, July 30, 1991, at 55.
47. See Stephen Bakan et al., 1991 Climate Response to Smoke from the Burning
Oil Wells in Kuwait, 351 NATURE 367-71 (1991) (assessing reports of the climatic
effects of the oil fires). The high pressures and temperatures caused the smoke to rise
very rapidly in the region's low pressure system, typical of summer months.
GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 19 (citations omitted). Immediate concerns were that
the Gulf region's drop in temperature would adversely affect the Asian monsoon, the
rainy season upon which agriculture in southern Asia depends. Horgan, Burning Ques-
tions, supra note 7, at 20. Monsoons are the result of warm, moist air rising from
the oceans in the summer months moving over the continent. Id. Although many
scientists ultimately dispensed with the notion that the oil fires would affect the mon-
soon season, two groups studied the huge typhoon that struck Bangladesh on May 1,
1991 to look for guidance. I. Researchers from Germany's Max Planck Institute for
Chemistry questioned whether the smoke could have triggered the massive typhoon
which killed over 100,000 people. Id. One researcher concluded that there was no
connection; typhoons typically strike during early May. Id. An expert on monsoons
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composition of the burning, unrefined oil,48 the temperature of the re-
gion would drop ten degrees Fahrenheit.49
1. Threat to Civilians
The most immediate threat to civilians in the region was the nighttime
thermal inversion, which consisted of a warm layer of air that trapped a
cooler layer of air at the earth's surface.5" The trapped air contained
the oil fires' noxious fumes, holding them close to the ground where the
polluted air could be inhaled by humans."' Normally, the heat of the
morning sun breaks thermal inversions and allows the trapped air to rise
and disperse. 2 Because the oil fires emitted such dense smoke, howev-
er, little sunlight could break through the sooty clouds to trigger the
thermal inversion.53
Outbreaks of respiratory and skin disorders reinforced the concern
about polluted air hovering too close to the ground.' Health officials
issued warnings to residents in at-risk groups, such as the elderly, young
children, and persons suffering from asthmatic conditions, to stay in-
disagreed with that finding, however. Id. He asserted that the typhoon's two feet high
flooding and heavy rains were unusually severe and may be linked to the Kuwaiti
fires. Id.
48. See GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 20 (analyzing chemical content of burn-
ing oil). Kuwaiti crude oil contains a very high sulfur concentration, that combine
with the fires' oxygen to create daily emissions of more than 40,000 - tons of sulfur
dioxide, the major chemical component to acid rain. Id. The daily sulfur dioxide
emissions of France, Germany and Great Britain combined are less than the oil fire's
contribution to air pollution. Id. The soot of the fires, however, is what contributed to
the darkened skies and lowered regional air temperature. Horgan, Up in Flames, supra
note 7, at 17. Scientists recorded approximately 100,000 tons of soot (carbon com-
pounds) and 800,000 tons of carbon dioxide (carbon combined with the fires' oxygen)
at the height of the conflagration. Id.
49. See Horgan, Burning Questions, supra note 7, at 24 (predicting temperature
change in Gulf region).
50. See GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 20 (describing the effects of thermal
inversion).
51. Id. A thermal inversion, which is very common in industrial areas situated in
mountain valleys, such as Denver, Colorado and Mexico City, is "an atmospheric
condition in which a layer of warm air traps cooler air near the surface of the earth,
preventing the normal rising of surface air." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
741 (2d ed. 1980).
52. See GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 20 (explaining thermal inversion).
53. Id.
54. See Warren, supra note 45, at 27 (linking respiratory ailments to thermal
inversions).
492 [VOL. 10: 1
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM 493
doors when the smoke clouds were overhead.' Consequently, the
region's levels of mortality from lung cancer, and other respiratory and
skin diseases is expected to rise dramatically over the next ten years due
to the heightened exposure to the air pollution.'
55. See Matthew L. Wald, After the War; Kuwaitis, Having Survived Hussein,
Now Find Their Environment Toxic, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1991, § 1. at 14 (reporting
lingering human health impact of oil fires). The World Health Organization issued the
warnings to Kuwaiti residents. Id. Doctors were also advising people with chronic
respiratory ailments not to return to Kuwait until the smoke had cleared. BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF STATE, TRAVEL ADVISORY KUWvAIT-CAUTION, (Oct. 11.
1991).
56. See GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 20-21 (predicting long-term human health
risk of oil fires). Because little is known about the long-term health effects on a
population from burning crude oil, researchers disagree about how to compare its po-
tential impact to known effects, such as coal-related pollution or photochemical oxi-
dants (smog). Id. For example, one researcher estimated that 1,000 excess deaths
would occur in the year following the war, 20% higher than Kuwait's mortality rate
before the war began. John Horgan, The Danger from Kuwait's Air Pollution: Smoke
from Oil Fires Threatens Health, SC!. AM., Oct. 1991, at 30. The estimate was based
on data from a 1952 air pollution episode in London in which 4,000 people died in
two weeks from coal fumes mixed with dense fog. Id.; Horgan. Up in Flames, supra
note 7, at 20.
Another scientist testified before the Senate Committee that although the con-
centration of inhalable particles increased, it was not higher than exposure levels
experienced in urban areas in the United States during the summer months. Effects of
Oil Fires in Kuwait Still Inconclusive, Panel Says, 14 Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) No.
21, at 576 (Oct. 23, 1991) [hereinafter Effects of Oil Fires]. The scientist compared
data from earlier instances of air pollution, such as the lethal 1952 London fog and
1930 New York City smog, where one in 2,000 deaths occurred during a five day
period. Id.
More common estimates predict the mortality rate for infants and the elderly.
the most vulnerable groups, to rise 10%. Anne Mcllroy, U.S. Hiding the Facts Critics
Say, GAZETTE (Montreal), Dec. 7, 1991, at A6 (citing a report by a doctor at
Harvard's School of Public Health). Other scientists predict prolonged respiratory prob-
lems based on the ailments afflicting patients visiting the region's hospitals. Warren.
supra note 45, at 27.
One British scientist expects a jump in the lung cancer rate over the next two
decades, due to the very high levels of particulate fall out, composed of trace metals
which are known carcinogens. Id. Sulfur dioxide's corrosive effect on lung tissue
when mixed with mucus poses other respiratory complications. Id. Furthermore, doc-
tors reported an unprecedented increase in cases of asthma, emphysema, severe ecze-
ma, and eye irritation due to the smoke. Id.
Although there is uncertainty as to what the cumulative effects of exposure to
the oil fires will be, cancers and birth defects are almost a certainty. GREENPEACF,
supra note 26, at 21.
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2. Threat to Military Personnel
The air pollution affected the troops as well as the civilians, despite
the coalition governments' apparent attempts to downplay what some
U.S. veterans of Operation Desert Storm have dubbed "The Black Lung
Tour."57 Officials from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) carefully monitored the
respiratory complaint rate of military personnel before and after the fires
started to ensure the tracking of short-term and long-term exposure.58
Although early reports concluded that the pollution would not pose a
health risk to people with normal respiratory capacity, government scien-
tists continue to conduct long-term studies of possible health risks.59
57. Horgan, supra note 56, at 30; see infra part III (discussing efforts to avoid
negative publicity).
58. Hearings II, supra note 41. Army Col. Frederick Erdtman testified before the
Senate Committee that "[t]he initial findings of the inter-agency assessment team indi-
cated that the toxic gases from the smoke were below hazardous levels and that im-
mediate health threats would be considered minimal for healthy populations such as
the military." Id. Military officials instructed their personnel "to avoid contact with
the smoke plumes when operationally feasible and to use scarfs and goggles that had
been issued . . . and . . . to cover any exposed skin surfaces." Id. Col. Erdtman
further stated that military members who did seek treatment for wheezing, coughing,
eye irritations, or sore throats were properly cared for, but that "[t]he respiratory com-
plaint rate was not noticeably higher among DOD personnel after the oil fires as
compared to rates prior to those fires." Id.; Soraya S. Nelson, Smoke from Burning
Wells Poses Health Risk, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at 10.
One example of inconsistent statements, however, was the EPA's response to
concerns of the families of United States troops about the soldiers' health risks asso-
ciated with exposure levels to the fires. Lee Hockstader, UN Official Urges Fast As-
sessment of Health Risks Posed by Oil Fires, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A14. A
Pentagon official noted that he found no imminent danger to U.S. soldiers or civilians
in the region due to the polluted air caused by the fires. Id. When asked about the
conclusion, an EPA spokesman responded, "Maybe he's got information we don't
have." Id.; see infra part III (noting that there is great confusion over how to handle
these critical health issues).
59. Richard L. Hembra, Introduction to U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., KUWAITI OIL
FIRES--CHRONIC HEALTH RISKS UNKNOWN BUT ASSESSMENTS ARE UNDER WAY
(1992). The report reviews and affirms the findings of an April 3, 1991 report, enti-
tled KUWAIT OIL FIRES: INTERAGENCY INTERIM REPORT, which assuaged grave con-
cerns raised by officials in Kuwait about the pollution from the fires and acute health
effects. Id.; see Hearings II, supra note 41 (describing specific studies underway by
DOD research teams on the long-term health impact of the fires on military person-
nel).
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Recent reports indicate that the U.S. military, despite its reluctance to
acknowledge any oil fire-related health risks, consented to monitor Gulf
War veterans afflicted with severe, unknown illnesses, now termed "Gulf
War Syndrome."'
Despite statements that the health risks appear minimal, some scientists are
outraged by the paucity of information gathered and disseminated. Horgan, supra note
56, at 30. One DOD official acknowledged that the studies were being conducted to
protect the Government from lawsuits by American veterans who are likely to develop
cancer, heart disease, chronic respiratory ailments such as emphysema, or other
smoke- and smog-related problems resulting from their Gulf war duty. Id. United
States soldiers who had fought in Vietnam brought lawsuits against the government as
a result of their exposure to the cancer-causing Agent Orange, which was used as a
defoliant in the jungles. Rae Tyson & Sam Vincent Meddis, Oil Fires Threaten
Health; Kuwait Blazes Compared to Agent Orange, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 15, 1991, at
IA (repeating Navy official's assertion that U.S. military learned a lesson from the
Agent Orange experience); see Alison Leigh Cowan, Reopening of Defoliant Case
Sought, N.Y. Tams, Nov. 30, 1993, at D4 (reporting that Vietnam veterans sought to
reopen litigation against Agent Orange manufacturers after learning about health prob-
lems related to the herbicide).
The issue of holding the U.S. Government liable for illnesses contracted during
military service and possible exposure to biological or chemical weapons. however, is
far from settled. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Senator Says U.S. Let Iraq Get Lethal
Viruses, N.Y. TIMS, Feb. 10, 1994, at A9 (uncovering shipments of viruses to Iraq
that contained suspect viruses); Gulf Veterans Sue Over Illnesses, N.Y. TIMES, June 9.
1994, at B11 (identifying eleven U.S. companies being sued by Gulf veterans suffer-
ing from mysterious illnesses).
60. See Some Gulf War Vets Afflicted with Mysterious Symptoms (CNN television
broadcast, Jan. 7, 1993) (interviewing a veteran suffering from environmental illness
presumably contracted during his Gulf War tour of duty); Study of Sick Gulf War
Vets, 18 WORLD ENV'T REP. No. 23 (Nov. 10. 1992) (estimating between 150 and
1,000 vets are suffering from illnesses doctors cannot identify). More recently, the
U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs reported that approximately 14,500 veterans out
of the 696,562 U.S. forces deployed to the Gulf suffer from unexplained illnesses.
See David Brown, Triumphant in the Desert, Stricken at Home, WASH. POST, July 24,
1994, at Al, A18 (charting the illnesses among coalition member forces); see also
David Brown, Colonel Loses Ground to a Faceless Enemy, WASH. POST. July 26,
1994, at Al (chronicling the changes affecting one Gulf veteran).
As a result of these claims, Congress will study and report on the possible
causes of the veterans' illnesses. See David Masci, Persian Gulf Syndrome Bill Heads
to President, CONG. Q., Oct. 15, 1994, at 2960 (reporting on the Senate measure to
compensate veterans suffering from Persian Gulf Syndrome); Bill McAllister, Compas-
sion May Take Act of Congress; Veterans Agency Balked at Early Response on Gulf
War Problem, WASH. POST, July 25, 1994, at Al (discussing Congress' response to
the veterans' claims that their illnesses were linked to their Gulf War service): David
Brown, Studies Will Frame a Picture of Gulf Veterans' Problems, WASH. POST, July
25, 1994, at A9 (outlining the strategies to be used by various agencies to track the
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
3. Threat to Firefighters
Of the population groups in the region, however, the firefighting
teams were the most directly exposed to the oil fires. 6' Approximately
10,000 firefighting personnel representing forty countries contracted with
the Kuwaiti government to extinguish the massive blazes, unquestionably
the world's worst oil field disaster to date.62 In just eight months, they
health of Gulf War veterans); David Brown, The Search for Causes, WASH. POST,
July 24, 1994, at A19 (categorizing possible causes for the veterans' illnesses, ranging
from smoke to psychological contagion); Administration Backs Aid for Gulf Veterans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at A15 (confirming the Clinton Administration's endorse-
ment of a bill to compensate Gulf veterans suffering from Persian Gulf Syndrome);
Bill McAllister, Illness Pay for Gulf Vets Is Endorsed, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994,
at Al (noting that Gulf veterans will be compensated even though the ailment re-
mains a mystery).
During the previous year, though, officials were still debating whether to classi-
fy the veterans' mysterious illnesses as a "syndrome." Philip J. Hilts, Gulf War Syn-
drome: Is It a Real Disease?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at Cl (discussing the
skepticism about calling the puzzling symptoms a disease); Health Panel Finds No
Single Cause for Gulf Veterans' Illnesses, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1994, at 40 (noting
that veterans "are suffering from illnesses of unknown cause, but no single syndrome
is discernible," according to a report by an independent panel of experts).
For a more in-depth analysis of the reproductive health effects possibly asso-
ciated with Gulf War Syndrome, see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., OPERATION DESERT
STORM--QUESTIONS REMAIN ON POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO REPRODUCTIVE TOXICANTS
(1994) (evaluating the reproductive hazards to Persian Gulf war veterans' offspring);
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., OPERATION DESERT STORM-POTENTIAL FOR REPRODUCTIVE
DYSFUNCTION Is NOT BEING ADEQUATELY MONITORED (1994) (statement of Kwai-
Cheung Chan, Issue Area Director, Program Evaluation & Methodology Division)
(recommending further studies to address issues about the war's long-term reproductive
health effects). Interestingly, the DOD did not assess the potential reproductive effects
of exposure to oil-well fires before deployment because such fires were not expected.
There were also no studies on other petroleum exposure reported in the Persian Gulf
war-using diesel fuel as a sand suppressant, drying sleeping bags with leaded ex-
haust, and so on-because these activities were not standard operating procedures that
soldiers were trained to perform. OPERATION DESERT STORM-QUESTIONS REMAIN ON
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO REPRODUCTIVE TOXICANTS, supra, at 16.
61. See Matthew L. Wald, Experts Worried by Kuwait Fires, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1991, at A7 (noting the fires' adverse impact on the life expectancy of 50,000
Kuwaitis). While civilians are the subjects of both long and short-term studies, the
studies are not concerned with firefighters per se. Id.; see also infra note 64 (de-
tailing the health risks of oil firefighters).
62. See FIRES OF KUWAIT, supra note 3 (depicting firefighting squads at work in
Kuwait). The firefighters received $1,000 to $2,000 for their twelve-hour daily shifts
where they faced temperatures up to four thousand degrees Fahrenheit. HELL ON
496 [VOL. 10: 1
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM 497
"killed" over seven hundred fires, many years ahead of the most conser-
vative estimates of when the fires could be extinguished.'
Even fewer statistics are available to assess what the short-term and
long-term effects of oil fires are on the firefighters.' Unlike the tissue
samples taken from deceased military personnel to analyze pollutant
levels,' the remains of firefighters are usually so badly burned that not
much data is retrievable.'
EARTH, supra note 2. The few specialized firefighting squads who travel all over the
world to "kill" oil field fires asserted that the conflagration on the Kuwait oil fields
dwarfed any they had ever seen. Hearings 1, supra note 3; David Maraniss, No Com-
puters Needed, Pahdner, as Firefighters Face Kuwait Infernos, NVASH. POST, Mar. 9,
1991, at A3; Matthew L. Wald, Surge of Water in Uncapped Wells to Hamper Ku-
wait Oil Production, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1991. at Al.
63. See Hearings I. supra note 3 (transcribing Red Adair's claim that Kuwait
will be lucky to extinguish all fires within four to five years). "Kill" is a Texan term
of art which firefighters use to describe an extinguished well fire, according to Paul
"Red" Adair, a legendary oil field firefighter. Id. Estimates varied as to exactly how
many wells were burning and how many years it would take for firefighters to battle
the blazes. Id. While the Kuwaiti Oil Company claimed that all 950 of its producing
oil wells ignited, other reports show that 732 well fires burned. Nicholas Schoon &
Susan Watts, Crisis in the Guf." Pollution is Graphic Legacy of War, INDEPENDENr,
Mar. 2, 1991, at 9; Effects of Oil Fires, supra note 56. at 576. Other figures repre-
sented 600 wells on fire by the end of the war, with an additional eighty wells gush-
ing oil uncontrollably but not ablaze. Cushman, supra note 39, at C4. At most, 1,250
Kuwaiti wells perished, including 500 wells in the neutral zone between Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait that Iraq also seized. Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 17. Predic-
tions as to the length of time needed to put out all of the fires ranged from two to
ten years. ARKIN ET" AL., supra note 11, at 72; Hearings I, supra note 3 (providing
Red Adair's estimate of five years to complete firefighting effort).
64. See John Travis, A Legacy of War, 140 Scd. NEws 24, 25-26 (1991) (de-
scribing how small particles of soot are trapped in the human respiratory system
which inhibit proper breathing). Oil firefighters often cannot wear protective face
masks because of their tendency to melt. FIRES OF KuvArr, supra note 3. As a re-
sult, they are more susceptible to health problems due to their proximity to the fires
than are civilians. ld.
65. See Horgan, supra note 56, at 30 (noting tissue analysis method). The United
States Armed Forces Institute of Pathology based a study on an analysis of tissue
samples from soldiers who were killed during combat or otherwise, in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. Id The investigation focused on the differences between smoke-induced
changes, such as cellular or genetic damage, and elevated levels of toxins. Id.
66. FIRES OF KUWAIT, supra note 3. The most dangerous part of the firefighting
operation occurs just as firefighters cap and kill the blazing wellhead. Id. Methane
gas, which has no scent and is extremely volatile, lingers unless a special tube, called
a diverter tube, is attached to the wellhead to draw the gas away from the workers
bolting the new wellhead in place. HELL ON EARTH. supra note 2. A spark from the
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Despite the inherent danger of this particular form of firefighting, few
deaths resulted from the Kuwaiti assignment.' In fact, more civilians
than firefighters died as a result of the Persian Gulf War.6" Nonethe-
less, the direct exposure to the flames' searing heat, burning crude oil,
and detonations will have a profound though not yet measured impact
on the lives of the firefighters.'
pneumatic wrench securing the new valve could mean instantaneous death for the
workers, so rubberized tools are used wherever possible. Id.
67. Hearings I, supra note 3 (providing Red Adair's testimony that he had lost
no men to the Kuwaiti oil fires). James Deckard, the cameraman who filmed Hell on
Earth, spent six weeks filming the firefighters, who called themselves "Hell fighters."
Zan Dubin, O.C. Cameraman Found 'Hell on Earth' in Kuwait, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9,
1992, at Fl. Deckard remarked, "Most of the (firefighters) themselves are high school
graduates, . . . they're just doing a job they wanted for the money (which ranged
from $1,00 to $2,000 a day). But they risk their lives and they also understood how
important (their job) was . . . . I think they're heroes." Id. (parentheticals in origi-
nal). Although over 10,000 firefighting support staff were involved in the effort, there
were 550 firefighters specialized in oil field firefighting. Id.; see Hearings 1, supra
note 3; Hearings II, supra note 41 (describing the mine clearing and firefighting
techniques); see also HELL ON EARTH, supra note 2; FIRES OF KUWAIT, supra note 3
(showing actual film footage of the innovative firefighting techniques used to extin-
guish the oil well blazes).
68. See Hedges, supra note 21, at A4 (describing "sappers" who deactivate mines
and clear away unexploded munitions in the desert). Four thousand sappers combed
the Kuwaiti desert even after firefighters extinguished the oil fires, in search of
500,000 land mines and 100,000 tons of unexploded munitions dropped during the
war. Id. Over fifty sappers accidentally died due to the explosives, including the
entire five-person team from Kuwait. Id. Many attributed the deaths to the long expo-
sure to the elements, which made many shells and mines unstable during routine
handling. Id. In addition, the weapon often exploded before the detection device could
signal its presence to the sapper. Id. The sappers perform their work just ahead of
the firefighters to ensure that they diminish the danger posed by undetected mines as
much as possible to both firefighters and unsuspecting civilians. HELL ON EARTH,
supra note 2. Despite the precautions, however, there were 1,500 civilian casualties
and one hundred injuries. Hedges, supra note 21.
Moreover, an international minesweeping flotilla cleared commercial shipping
lanes of the 1,200 mines laid in the Gulf, using global-positioning systems (naviga-
tional devices able to calculate precise geographic locations at sea via satellite hook-
up). Eric Schmitt, Allied Flotilla Quickly Clears Mines Off Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 1991, at A10.
69. See FIRES OF KUWAIT, supra note 3 (suggesting that firefighters will suffer
major health problems as they age due to their line of work). The most common
method of extinguishing blazing oil wellheads is to blow them up with dynamite and
other types of explosives, such as plastique, an easily molded, putty-like substance:
Kuwait: Deliberate Oil Pollution Threatens to Be an Environmental Catastrophe,
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C. COMPOSITION OF THE OIL SMOKE
Coupled with human health concerns, the composition of chemicals in
the oily smoke alarmed researchers.70 The researchers had little data on
the subject because no studies were available that assessed the impact of
burning crude oil on the population at large on the environment.'
Lacking scientific evidence, many scientists feared that the smoke's fine
particles would contribute to the world's acid rain, ozone depletion, or
global warming problems?2 A few scientists even argued to the other
extreme, asserting that the ozone layer above the region actually had
thickened,' potentially causing a minor nuclear winter.7 '
To begin their measurements, scientists investigated the chemical
composition of oil, which includes sulfur, carbon, nitrogen oxides, and
GUAmDIAN, Mar. 12, 1991, at 2. Once briny water pumped through high-pressure
hoses cools the wellhead, a package of explosives is lowered into the wellhead and
detonated, severing the supply of oil to the flame and "capping" the wellhead with
sandy debris. I&
70. GREENPEACE supra note 26, at 20 (citation omitted). The unique situation
posed by the Kuwaiti oil fires was commented upon by a Kuwaiti official in the
Environmental Protection Department: "Because the crude oil smoke particles have a
different chemical composition[,] their relative toxicity compared to coal smoke parti-
cles is an unknown." Id.
71. See Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 24 (noting paucity of informa-
tion linking oil well fires to human health). One biomass expert at the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration indicated that the scant information that does exist
on oil well fires is classified for reasons of national security. Id.; see infra part 111
(discussing the rationale behind the suppression of information about the war).
72. See Horgan, Burning Questions, supra note 7. at 17, 20 (noting scientists'
contention that due to lack of evidence, global effects should not be ruled out); see
also Warren, supra note 45, at 27 (raising concerns over lack of available environ-
mental impact data). See generally Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 20, 24
(discussing oil fires' potential environmental impact); GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at
24 (addressing local and global environmental effects of the Gulf War).
73. See ENvIRONiMENTAL LEGACY, supra note 26, at 21 (describing how ozone
build-up occurred at air pollution sampling locations where high levels of hydrocar-
bons and nitrogen oxides were recorded).
74. Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 20, 24. The nuclear winter theorists,
such as Carl Sagan and Richard Turco of the United States, created models to show
how the smoke plume would reach into the upper atmosphere and disperse and block
out the sun's rays to cool the earth's surface. Id. Their models were heavily criticized
internationally, however, for promoting a political antiwar agenda. Id. One climatolo-
gist commented that the air pollution would be analogous to a bad day at the Los
Angeles airport. Id. (citation omitted).
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trace metals.75 When ignited, these chemicals combine with oxygen to
create sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, complex nitro-
gen oxides and ozone, all of which are compounds that will seriously
alter the planet's ecological balance.76 In fact, some scientists liken the
Kuwaiti inferno to a petroleum Chernobyl.'
Each compound found in the oily smoke harms the environment in a
different way. Sulfur dioxide, for example, is the chief component in
acid rain, which has been linked to the gradual destruction of lakes,
crops, and forests in industrial regions.78 Another compound, carbon
dioxide, which contributes to acid rain and global warming, was the
most prevalent by-product of the oil fires.79 The oil fires' release of
carbon dioxide hindered governments' efforts to reduce such emissions
over the next decade."0 Moreover, scientists detected nitrogen oxides at
elevated concentrations in the smoke.8' Nitrogen oxides, combined with
75. See GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 17 (indicating chemical composition of
smoke plume produced from oil).
76. Id.
77. See James George & Brent Blackwelder, Oil Fires: A Middleast Chernobyl?,
TORONTO STAR, July 10, 1991, at A21 (comparing oil fires to 1986 Ukrainian nuclear
power plant accident); see also Daphne Bramham, Environment Damage Downplayed
by U.S., OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 27, 1991, at B4 (making Chernobyl analogy).
78. See Ken Wells, Legacy of War: The Battles Are Over, But Gulf Environment
Still Fights for Its Life, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1991, at Al (noting the linkage be-
tween sulfur dioxide and acid rain affecting crops and water sources).
79. See Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 17 (providing tonnages estimates
of compounds emitted into the air by the fires).
80. See id. (noting scientists' criticism of the government's attempts to reduce
global carbon dioxide emissions as meager, in light of high emissions from the oil
fires); see also Kuwaiti Oil Fires Had No Global Effect on Atmosphere, World
Weather Agency Says, 15 Int'l Envt'l Daily (BNA) No. 12, at 412 (June 17, 1992)
(recognizing heavy carbon dioxide levels in the Gulf due to fires). On June 24, 1991,
the National Science Foundation found that the oil fires released one to two million
tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, approximately one percent of the world's
annual production of carbon dioxide. Id. Other scientists predicted that the Philippine
volcano, Mount Pinatubo, would have a greater impact on global air pollution than
the smoke from the Kuwaiti oil fires. William Booth, Fires in Kuwait Not a Threat
to Global Climate, Federal Study Finds, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at A3; Daphne
Bramham, Black Death in the Gulf' Environmentalists Accuse Governments of Playing
Down Potential Dangers from Blazing Oil Wells, VANCOUVER SUN, July 27, 1991, at
B1, B4, B6.
81. GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 21. One researcher found, however, that the
levels of nitrogen oxides were actually lower than normal, due to the decrease in
automobile traffic, which is a common producer of the pollution. Id.; Effects of Oil
Fires in Kuwait Still Inconclusive, Panel Says, 14 Int'l Envtl Daily (BNA) No. 21, at
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carbon compounds in the presence of sunlight, create photochemical
smog.' The smoke also contained trace metals, some of which are hu-
man carcinogens.'
D. WATER POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH
In addition to the air pollution caused by the burning oil wells, the
region's environment suffered "unprecedented" devastation.' The pre-
cious fresh water supply was severely threatened,' including dozens of
desalination plants that convert salty Gulf water into potable water for
the region." As the region continues to industrialize and populate rap-
576 (Oct. 23, 1991).
82. IL
83. See iL (citing Kuwait Environmental Protection Department report regarding
Kuwaiti oil fire atmosphere, presented to World Meteorological Organization. Geneva,
Apr. 27-30, 1991). Varying levels of zinc, cadmium, chromium, lead and vanadium
were detected in the smoke plume. Ia Cadmium and chromium are carcinogenic even
at low levels of exposure. I. (citing Stephen Pain, Is Kuvait's Foul Air Fit to
Breathe? NEw SCL, Oct. 26, 1991). Dichlorobenzene was also found in the plume at
levels 200 times greater than United States standards permit. Mcllroy, supra, note 56.
at K6. Dichlorobenzene damages the liver, kidneys and respiratory system. Id. Ben-
zene, a chemical linked with leukemia, and xylene, another significant smog contribu-
tor, were also discovered in the plume. GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 21.
84. See Kuwait: Deliberate Oil Pollution Threatens to Be an Environmental Ca-
tastrophe, GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 1991, at 2 (describing the "unprecedented" environ-
mental impact of the oil fires). In addition to comparing the Kuwaiti oil fires to the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, one fire researcher stated, "[V]e have never seen a pollu-
tion event of this scale." Horgan, Up in Flames, supra note 7, at 24. A biomass
burning. expert added, "This is the most intense burning source, probably, in the histo-
ry of the world" Id.
85. See Alan Cowell, More Precious Titan Oil, and Maybe as Volatile, N.Y.
TIsS, Mar. 17, 1991, § 4, at 3 (discussing notion that increasing water scarcity will
likely be the next cause of war in the Middle East). Iraqi troops targeted and de-
stroyed Kuwait's desalination facilities. Id; SEN. ALBERT GORF, EARTH IN THE BAL-
ANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRtT 113 (1992) (mentioning that Iraq's inten-
tional release of oil into the Gulf fouled the area's drinking water pipes). Additional-
ly, the Gulf oil spill aggravated India's immense water pollution problem. Hau~wr,
supra note 42. Seventy percent of India's water is polluted. Id.
86. See Hauser, supra note 42 (noting the large number of desalination operations
in region). Seventy percent of the region's fresh water is supplied by one hundred
desalination plants operated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, composed
of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait. Id. Bah-
rain expects to build additional desalination and utilities projects with S196 million
already set aside for the plan, while the United Arab Emirates is funding a S137
million desalination plant as well as $900 million in new water and electric facilities.
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idly, the demand for clean water will be even more critical than it is
now.8
Although the six million barrels of oil Iragi troops deliberately
dumped into the Gulf may be the world's worst oil spill to date,8 ap-
proximately two million barrels of oil were recovered from the placid
Gulf waters. 9 The recovered oil would most likely have damaged the
industrial and desalination facilities had it not been retrieved." Because
Id. Other plans of GCC states to obtain fresh water include importing water via a
pipeline from Turkey to Oman, attempting to supplement eighty-five billion gallons of
water currently desalinated by seventeen facilities. Id.
87. Hauser, supra note 42. Conservation of water resources is considered to be
"the most pressing issue for the next decade." Id. Some suggest that a dispute over
water rights will be the next cause of war. See, e.g., GORE, supra note 85, at 113
(discussing the possibility that "geopolitical conflicts over water" will not be resolved
peacefully and may lead to war, using as an example, Turkey's threat against Iraq
during Persian Gulf war to cut flow of Tigris); Irwin Ploss & Jonathan Rubinstein,
Water for Peace, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 7-14, 1992, at 20-22 (proposing that the reso-
lution of water rights conflicts will bring peace to the Middle East); Norman Myers,
Environment and Security, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y 23, 38-39 (Spring 1989) (arguing that
focusing on environmental issues is key to national security in U.S.-"Third World"
relationships, and noting that competition for water in the Middle East is the source
of the greatest environmental conflict).
88. GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 6 (citing Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defence
and Aviation report on oil and air pollution) (citation omitted). Some researchers ar-
gue, however, that the region was already seriously polluted even before the Gulf war
began. Gulf States Urged to Respond to Pollution Threat, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Mar. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, AFP File. Residual oil spills
from the Iran-Iraq war, oil tanker bilge, and other oil leakages account for nearly two
million barrels of oil spilled every year. Id. In fact, an estimated six million barrels
of oil per year pollute the world's seas and oceans. Id.
89. See Hearings II, supra note 41 (remarks of Bill Reilly, former head of the
EPA) (comparing the calmer and warmer Persian Gulf to Prince William Sound,
where the Exxon-Valdez tanker spill occurred in 1989). The Gulf waters exchange
over a period of five years through the Straits of Hormuz, whereas the waters off the
rocky coast of Alaska very actively exchange with the Gulf of Alaska. Id. The warm
Gulf waters also aided the natural processes of evaporation and volatilization, which
did not occur in the frigid Alaskan waters. Id. One U.S. official stated that half of
the six million barrels of oil which spilled eventually evaporated or volatilized. Id.
For an in-depth account of the spill's impact on the Gulf and its coastline, see
GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 8-16; see also Kelly, supra note 35, at 927 n.37
(describing the Persian Gulfs geography).
90. See Greenpeace News Conference: Environmental, Military, and Human Ef-
fects of the Persian Gulf War One Year Later, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 10, 1992,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, FEDNEW File (asserting that the industrial and
desalination facilities were protected at the expense of the most environmentally sensi-
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the Gulf's waters are shallow, the remaining oil easily penetrated the
coastline, contaminating marshes, fishing, and shrimping areas.' Some
of the oil solidified after the toxins evaporated, leaving an asphalt-like
residue which sank to the Gulf's sandy bottom.'
III. SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION
The information presented to this point was compiled from sources
carefully monitored by the coalition governments, in particular the gov-
ernments of Kuwait, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.' The follow-
ing section explores the reasons why these governments continue to sup-
press information relating to the war's human and environmental ef-
fects.94
Although recent studies suggest that the Kuwaiti oil fires did not have
a global impact, 5 many people distrust the findings.0 Some believe
five Gulf areas). Because cleanup efforts initially focused on the industry-related see-
tions of the Gulf region and not on the less developed areas, the fragile ecosystems
were unnecessarily damaged. IcL; Ken Wells, Legacy of War: The Battles Are Over,
but Gulf Environment Still Fights for Its Life, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1991, at A10.
Furthermore, because the spill affected a 460-mile continuous stretch of coastline,
neither plants nor animals were able to begin the natural healing processes. Id.
91. See GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 34 (noting the impact on the fish and
shrimp industry); Francis McKenna, Oil Cleanup Efforts Move Into Top Gear, MIDDLE
E. NEWs NETWORK, Apr. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR library, ALLNVS
File (observing that seafood catches had decreased by an estimated 15%). Dolphins,
turtles, fish, shrimp, birds, mangroves, coral reef and planton were seriously affected
by the pollution. Samia Nakoul, Oil Lakes in Kuwait Are Traps for Birds, INDEPEN-
DENT, Dec. 10, 1991, at 12. For example, shrimp stock was at less than one percent
of its 1990 level. Indira Chand, Pollution Hitting Gulf Shrimp Stocks; Shrimping Ban
Urged, MIDDLE E. NEws NETWORK, June 3, 1992, available in LEXIS. MDEAFR
Library, ALLNWS File.
92. See Cooke, supra note 46, at 55 (commenting on unrecovered oil in Gulf);
Kuwait: Deliberate Oil Pollution Threatens to Be an Environmental Catastrophe,
GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 1991, at 2 (pointing out lasting oil damage to Gulf).
93. See sources cited infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
adequacy of available information).
94. See sources cited infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
adequacy of available information).
95. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 7, at C5 (summarizing a study conducted by the
National Science Foundation concluding that the oil fires had a major impact on the
Gulf region but not the rest of the planet); Kuwait Oil Fires Had No Global Effect
on Atmosphere, World Weather Agency Says. 15 Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) No. 12, at
412 (June 17, 1992) (reporting that the World Meteorological Organization found that
the fires had a regional impact); Booth, supra note 80, at A3 (finding regional, but
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that the data are being manipulated to place a "positive spin" on what is
otherwise evidence of widespread damage.' Others contend that a gag
order put in place by coalition governments, particularly the United
States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, has led to a scarcity of data. 8 The
possible reasons behind each government's actions, or inactions, are
discussed below.
A. THE U.S. MOTIVE FOR SUPPRESSING INFORMATION
Long before the tensions in the Persian Gulf region erupted into war,
the United States was carefully watching maneuvers in the Middle East
for reasons of national security." National security has traditionally
not global, effects in a government-sponsored study).
96. See Booth, supra note 80, at A3 (noting that environmentalists accused gov-
ernment-sponsored scientists of "putting a positive spin" on findings). Several com-
mentators question the adequacy of the information available. See McIlroy, supra note
56, at K6 (suggesting that the existence of a gag order on information is due to re-
cent U.S. elections). Greenpeace concluded its report on the environmental impact of
the Gulf war by responding to the argument that the scientific evidence does not
prove that the fires have had a global effect:
[A]bsence of scientific proof should not lead to assumptions that damage has
not occurred or will not become evident in the future, but to more good quali-
ty studies. It is imperative that the authorities in the region and the internation-
al community increase their efforts to discover the extent to which the environ-
ment and public have been affected. That they have been affected is beyond
question-the extent has yet to be discovered.
GREENPEACE, supra note 26, at 34.
97. See Booth, supra note 80, at A3 (suggesting "positive spin" on findings may
be due to government pressure).
98. See John Horgan, Why Are Data Being Withheld?, SCI. AM., July 1991, at
20; Horgan, supra note 10, at 24. Greenpeace's William Arkin asserts that "the pauci-
ty of data . . . is the result of aggressive policies of secrecy on the part of the Bush
Administration and allied governments." ARKIN Er AL., supra note 11, at 9.
99. See Matthew L. Wald, Gulf Victory: An Energy Defeat?, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 1991, at DI (analyzing the growing U.S. dependence on OPEC oil, despite their
tenuous relationship since the 1970s). OPEC's hold on the world oil market, however,
may be loosening as its own members are disobeying production and pricing policies.
Rowen, supra note 39, at B10.
Since the end of the war, the oil market has continued to fluctuate around the
world, with industrializing nations demanding increasing amounts of oil. See, e.g.,
Douglas Jehl, Iran Said to Buy Oil from Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at A7
(noting concern for purchases of Iraqi oil by Iran); William Branigin, Oil-Hungry Asia
Relying More on Middle East, WASH. POsT, Apr. 18, 1993, at A33 (reporting soaring
demand for oil by Asian countries); Youssef M. Ibrahim, Oil Prices, Plunging, May
Not Have Hit Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at DI (providing historical per-
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been linked to oil security." Because the United States is the world's
largest oil consumer, it must be able to rely on an uninterrupted flow of
imported oil,1"' the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait threatened that supply.,'
Consequently, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the U.S.
military was on the alert.m After the Bush Administration amassed
overwhelming public support for the commitment of U.S. military forces
to battle," the coalition forces commenced their strike and achieved
almost instantaneous victory."
The sudden victory, however, was clouded by growing concern for
human and environmental health relating to the oil fires that burned
after the war ended."° The U.S. Department of Energy responded by
issuing the following statement: "Most independent studies and experts
suggest that the catastrophic predictions in some recent news reports are
exaggerated. We are currently reviewing the matter, but these predictions
remain speculative and do not warrant any further comment at this
time.
, l 't
When asked to comment on the statement, an agency spokesman said
the order was temporary and was designed to protect the security of
allied military operations."t3 A more probable reason, however, is that
satellite images revealed huge smoke plumes caused by U.S. bombing of
spective to the drop in oil prices due to record oil production worldwide). At present,
Kuwait predicts that its oil exports will exceed its pre-war levels. Joseph B. Treaster,
Kuwait's Oil Industry Rises From the Ashes of War, N.Y. TmIES, Nov. 6. 1994. at
12.
100. See YERGIN, supra note 15, at 770 (explaining U.S. shrinking "security mar-
gin" gap between oil demand and production capacity); see also THE PRIZF, supra
note 5 (depicting the U.S. quest for foreign oil supplies to replace domestic reserves).
But see YERGIN, supra, at A21 (suggesting shift from "security dimensions" of oil to
its "environmental dimensions").
101. See YERGiN, supra note 5, at 745 (explaining the difficult role of the United
States as both the world's largest oil importer and second largest oil producer in the
mid-1980s).
102. Id. at 772-73.
103. See generally ARKIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 10 (describing preliminary
military activity to prepare for war).
104. Id. at 25-39.
105. Id.
106. See supra part ll.B (raising concern over effects of oil fires on human and
environmental welfare).
107. Horgan, supra note 10, at 24 (quoting a Department of Energy memorandum
ordering that all Department personnel and contractors discontinue speaking to the
media about war-related research until further notice).
108. Id.
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Iraqi facilities."° If such images were released, the notion that all of
the environmental destruction was caused solely by the Iraqis would
have been dispelled, forcing the United States to share the burden of
responsibility for the devastation."'
Moreover, the United States had learned a painful lesson during the
Vietnam war when military personnel began to sue the government for
their exposure to Agent Orange."' The present policy of limiting offi-
cial discussion of the potential health hazards resulting from the oil fires
reflects that lesson.'12
B. KuwArri AND SAUDI ARABIAN MOTIVES
FOR SUPPRESSING INFORMATION
While the United States argued that releasing war-related information
could threaten national security,"' Kuwait's concerns dealt more with
repopulating its country."4 Over one million citizens fled Kuwait after
the Iraqi invasion."' Furthermore, both the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
governments wanted to maintain their privacy in light of all the intru-
sions by environmentalists and media personnel." 6
109. Id.
110. Id.; see Horgan, supra note 98, at 20 (chronicling the Bush Administration's
efforts to downplay environmental reports of burning oil wells); Angela Singer, Will
There Be Swallows Next Summer?, UNIV. NEws SERVICES, Oct. 10, 1991 (interview-
ing researcher who had difficulty obtaining data from the U.S. military due to its
classified nature and the military's reluctance to admit to any environmental damage it
inflicted).
111. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting the Agent Orange contro-
versy of the Vietnam War).
112. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. military's con-
cern over being held liable to Gulf veterans). But see supra note 60 and accompany-
ing text (stating that the military consented to monitor Gulf veterans afflicted with
mysterious illnesses); John F. Harris, U.S. to Probe 'Persian Gulf Syndrome', WASH.
POST, May 13, 1994, at A4 (confirming that the military would conduct a new probe
to determine the cause(s) of the illnesses).
113. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (noting national security rea-
sons behind suppressing war data).
114. See Simon Tisdall, Fall-Out from Burning Oil Wells is Causing Mass Sick-
ness, GUARDIAN, Mar. 26, 1991, at 22 (noting that the population of Kuwait before
the invasion was 1.7 million, and estimating that only 450,000 remained).
115. Id.
116. See ARKIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 13 (describing environmental and media
intrusion into daily lives of Kuwaitis and Saudi Arabians).
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Additionally, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were interested in limiting full
disclosure of the war's environmental impact because the cleanup was
occurring slowly due to inadequate procedures and other restraints."'
The neighboring nations wanted to regain a sense of normalcy without
intrusive media coverage." 8
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Despite apparent attempts by coalition leaders to downplay the urgen-
cy of the situation, the Persian Gulf War's massive toll on human and
environmental health cannot be overlooked." 9 This section confronts
the existing international legal mechanisms, and recommends the incor-
poration of more proactive remedies, whether by way of an international
criminal court," a "Green Cross, ' 2' or through a fifth Geneva Con-
vention on the environment.'2
117. Id. The countries' oil industries were also cautious about publicizing the ex-
tent of damage suffered. Wald, supra note 99, at D1; William Booth, Kuwait's Oil
Woes May-Be Permanent, WASH. POST, May 2. 1991, at Al.
118. Id.; see Greenpeace News Conference on Impact of the Persian Gulf War on
the Persian Gulf, FED. NEws SERVICE, May 29, 1991. available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Greenpeace News Conference] (noting the nervous-
ness of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over their lack of response to the oil fires' effects,
and their eagerness to regain population and sovereignty). Coupled with the countries'
concern for repopulation were fears that investment capital would be channeled out-
side of the Persian Gulf. See Ibrahim, supra note 8. at 14 (tallying the figures report-
ed by the Arab Monetary Fund that excluded the war's toll on the environment and
the region's economic growth).
119. See ARKN ET AL., supra note 11 at 13 (probing the health and environmen-
tal effects of oil fires).
120. See Persian Guy' The Question of lVar Crimes: Hearings Before the Senate
Comnm on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1991) (statement of Robert
Woetzel) [hereinafter Hearings 11] (proposing an international adjudication system to
handle war criminals, including those who use the environment as a weapon).
121. See Susan Watts, Environment Should Be Protected During War, INDEPEN-
DENT, June 4, 1991, at 3 (endorsing Greenpeace's call for an environmental version
of the International Red Cross).
122. See Sarah Lee, A Geneva Convention for the Environment, 135 SOLIC. J.
386, 386 (1991) (outlining the convention to outlaw use of the environment as a
weapon); Amanda Brown, Call to Make Environmental Destntction a War Crime,
PREss Assoc. NEWSFILE, June 3, 1991 (reporting EC Environment Commissioner's
plea to establish independent tribunal under fifth Geneva Convention to prosecute war
criminals); Wendy Benedetto, Big Job Waiting for U.S. Firms with the Know-How,
USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 1991, at I1A (supporting the convention to forbid using the
environment as a weapon of war and to obligate warring nations to minimize destruc-
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A. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MECHANISMS
International law has struggled for almost a century with the issue of
environmental destruction during wartime," applying tenets from areas
of international environmental law as well as the law of international
warfare." Within each of these categories of international law are ar-
eas of conventional law and customary law. Conventional law or "hard
law" is the result of agreements, conventions, and treaties entered into
by a nation voluntarily,"i whereas customary law or "soft law"
evolves slowly over time through state practice.'26 The following dis-
cussion summarizes existing laws that are or may be applicable to Iraq's
actions during the Persian Gulf War.' 7
tion of environment in warfare).
123. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 922-23 (summarizing events of environmental
destruction throughout history).
124. See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 18-19 (1991) (explaining the "functional approach" to applying international
environmental law to an international legal system); Zedalis, supra note 15, at 711
(discussing the application of international laws of war regarding the destruction of
property as a basis for holding Iraq liable for the damage to Kuwaiti oil fields). See
generally ARKIN ET AL., supra note 11, at app. B (providing a chronological summa-
ry of legal documents pertaining to environmental protection during wartime).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 102, 103 (1987) (explaining sources and evidence of international law).
126. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environ-
ment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 420-35 (1991) (explaining "soft law" as it relates to
international environmental law).
127. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 944-45 (discussing how the U.N. should have
forced Iraq to be accountable for its actions under specificied conventions). While Iraq
is not subject to the provisions of all of the international laws discussed herein, the
laws are included to serve two purposes. See United Nations Convention on the Pro-
hibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 (entered into force Oct. 5, 1978). First, Iraq
has refused to become a party to many of the agreements. Id. Second, some of the
agreements, such as the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, may soon be-
come customary law, in which case Iraq will be bound by them even in the absence
of voluntary choice. Id. Consequently, if Iraq were to repeat its actions, these laws
could bear some weight against Iraq in the future. Id.
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1. International Environmental Law
If the 1990s prove to be the decade of international law," interna-
tional environmental law could be at the forefront of global decision
making.29 The environmental atrocities of the Persian Gulf War may
be the point of departure for the trend. ' "
International environmental law currently operates through treaties,
conventions, agreements, and state practice, but with limited global im-
pact.' As the discussion below indicates, these arrangements must be
strengthened if we are to provide international legal protection in and
against future wars.'
a. Conventional Law
Seventy-three countries have signed the 1954 International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.'1 The agreement is
significant because it was the first multilateral treaty for the prevention
of pollution."M
128. See Hearings III, supra note 120 (suggesting that the current decade be de-
voted to international law).
129. kd.; see also William Walker, Canada Urges 'Eco-Terrorism' Lznv, TORONTO
STAR, July 11, 1991, at A13 (quoting a Canadian defense official who called for a
new law to prohibit ecological terrorism because existing international environmental
law is "undeveloped").
130. See Lee, supra note 122, at 386 (labeling the Gulf War as "the first war
against the environment"). A post-war example of Iraq's continuing hostilities against
the people and natural resources of the Gulf region occurred within its own borders.
See Thomas W. Lippman, Iraq's War on 'Marsh Arabs'; Artillery, Bulldozers Assault
Fragile Habitat, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1993. at Al, A13 (describing the deliberate
destruction of the marshes, "a fragile ecosystem unique in the region," and a "culture
[in southern Iraq] which has been present in the marshes for thousands of years");
Chris Hedges, In a Remote Southern Marsh, Iraq is Strangling the Shiites, N.Y.
TmMEs, Nov. 16, 1993, at Al (reporting on the campaign to drain the marshes and its
cruel impact on the residents); Chris Hedges, Iraqi Regime Fights To Kill a Way of
Life, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 28, 1993, at 12 (exploring the history of the marsh Arab
culture and its possible extinction at the hands of the current Iraqi regime).
131. Lee, supra note 122 at 386.
132. Id.
133. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.TS. 3. The agreement was amended in
1962, 1969 and 1971, and seventy-three states had signed the document by 1987. Id.
Iraq has not yet become a party. Iid
134. Id. Iraq was entreated to sign the agreement by parties to the Action Plan
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Almost twenty years later, in 1972, parties signed the convention on
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter for the purposes of preventing marine pollution and protecting
the oceans.'35 This convention was also designed to reduce the risk of
damaging human health.'36
Although Iraq is not a party to either of these broad conventions, it
did sign a regional convention in 1978, the Kuwait Convention, to pre-
vent marine pollution in the Persian Gulf.'37 The Kuwait Convention
provides that contracting parties "shall take all appropriate measures to
prevent . . . pollution caused by discharges from land reaching the Sea
Area . . . ."' The parties to the Kuwait Convention also ratified an
agreement providing that they "shall cooperate in taking the necessary
and effective measures to protect the coastline and related interests of
one or more of the States from the threat and effects of pollution due to
the presence of oil . . . in the marine environment resulting from marine
emergencies."' 39 Despite Iraq's duty as a signatory to uphold the terms
of the Kuwait Convention, it failed to abide by the agreement'" during
for the Development of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Areas of Bahrain,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, adopted
Apr. 23, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 501 [hereinafter Action Plan].
135. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165. The agreement was
signed by sixty-four states as of 1987. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601 reporter's notes (1987). The Action
Plan unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Iraq to sign this agreement. Action Plan,
supra note 134, at 509.
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 reporter's notes (1987).
137. Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 511. Other similarly applicable
conventions were also ratified during this time period, but are excluded from this
Comment for the sake of brevity.
138. Id. art. IV, at 514.
139. Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, Apr. 24, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 526.
Article I of the protocol defines "marine emergency" as any "incident, occurrence or
situation, however caused, resulting in substantial pollution or imminent threat of sub-
stantial pollution to the marine environment by oil or other harmful substances." Id.
art. I (emphasis added). Article X provides that "any Contracting State faced with a
marine emergency situation . . . shall (a) take every appropriate measure to combat
pollution and/or to rectify the situation .... Id. art. X.
140. Id. art. X.
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the Persian Gulf War. The most visible violations were the intentional
dumping of oil and setting of the oil well fires. 4
b. Customary Law
Many agreements, conventions, and treaties are grounded in customary
law as a result of "wide acceptance among the States particularly in-
volved in the relevant activity."'42 Unlike conventional law, however, a
principle of customary law is not binding on a state that opposes the
principle when it is developed.'43
Again, with respect to releasing oil into the Persian Gulf, two custom-
ary laws, deriving from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention," are
binding upon all States: the Stockholm Declaration of 1972'" and the
World Charter for Nature." The Stockholm Declaration, which covers
a wide range of protections for the environment, was followed by the
World Charter for Nature to enhance the Stockholm Declaration's provi-
sions and includes a section pertaining to environmental warfare."
Fortunately, the Law of the Sea Convention is finally enforceable now
that the requisite number of signatories have ratified the document."
Those who have signed, such as Iraq and the United States, are bound
141. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing Iraq's deliberate
efforts to ignite the oil well fires and release oil into the Persian Gull).
142. RESTATEMNT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
143. Id.; Richard A. Falk, Environmental Disruption by Military Means and Inter-
national Lmv, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND PoucY AP-
PRAISAL 33, 41 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).
144. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/122
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
145. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1982).
146. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7 U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 48th plen.
mtg. (1982).
147. See id. princ. 5 (stating that "[n]ature shall be secured against degradation
caused by warfare or other hostile activities").
148. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994) (entered
into force on Nov. 16, 1994). On November 16, 1993. the convention garnered the
requisite number of signatories for ratification to permit its entry into force in No-
vember 1994. See UN Convention on Law of the Sea Finally Enters into Force, Oil
Spill Intelligence Rep., Nov. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEVS Library, CURNWS
File (discussing the ratification process and environmental provisions of the conven-
tion).
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to its provisions under international law, including its environmental
protections. 49 As an example of customary law becoming conventional
law, the Law of the Sea Convention may be "the most complex interna-
tional instrument that has ever been negotiated."3 0
c. International Case Law
While not always controlling, international tribunals usually consider
international case law to be persuasive evidence of the law.' One in-
creasingly significant exception to that rule, however, was articulated in
1949 in Trail Smelter (Can. v. U.S.).' Trail Smelter established State
liability for transboundary air pollution as customary law.' 3 For exam-
ple, if Country A pollutes the air and the pollution travels to Country B,
Country A may be liable under customary international law for the harm
the pollution causes in Country B."5
With respect to Iraq's deliberate act of setting fire to Kuwait's oil
wells and the resulting air pollution, Trail Smelter should be applicable,
according to the logic of the decision. 5' An even stronger argument
for holding Iraq liable for the air pollution in Kuwait, and perhaps the
entire Persian Gulf region, concerns Iraq's historical claims to Ku-
wait."6 If Iraq has dominion over Kuwait as its rightful territory,"
7
149. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 144, art. 12 (describing provi-
sions of protecting and preserving environment, including sections on enforcement of
regional and global cooperation).
150. Rebecca J. Fowler, Law of the Sea: An Odyssey to U.S. Acceptance, WASH.
POST, July 29, 1994, at A3 (quoting Secretary of State Warren Christopher, one of
the key U.S. negotiators). Among its many provisions, the treaty supports environmen-
tal protection for the high seas, which represent the 'common heritage of mankind."
Id. Moreover, the treaty guarantees full sovereignty to signatories over the seas that
extend twelve miles offshore. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, the treaty also
offers a nation control over 200 miles from its coastline for oil and gas rights. Id.
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 103 cmt. b (1987).
152. Trail Smelter (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949) (holding a
Canadian smelter plant liable for serious environmental damage caused by its heavy
sulfur dioxide emissions that adversely affected Washington state). The international
tribunal that decided the case declared: "[N]o state has the right to use . . . its terri-
tory in such a manner as to cause injury . . . to the territory of another .... Id.
at 1965.
153. Id.
154. See id. (interpreting the meaning of the international tribunal's decision).
155. Id.; see also John E. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1963 CANADIAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 213 (analyzing problems and applications of the case in international law).
156. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (stating Iraq's notion that Kuwait
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then Iraq should be liable for environmental damages caused in those
areas within its control. '
Underlying these arguments is the principle of State responsibility.
State responsibility creates an obligation under customary international
law for a country to remedy a wrongful act involving the natural re-
sources or environment of another country." Once again, however, the
principle cannot be enforced against a recalcitrant nation under current
international environmental law."
2. International Warfare Law
International warfare law provides another source by which wartime
environmental destruction can be remedied." The two major conven-
tions dealing with this issue are discussed below.
a. Conventional Law
Two conventional warfare laws emphasize prohibitions on intentionally
destroying the natural environment during wartime: the 1977 Environ-
mental Modification Convention (ENMOD)' and Protocol I to the
is within its border).
157. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
159. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 268 (1992) (stating the definition of state responsibility). The
principle reads:
1. A State is responsible under international law for a breach of an internation-
al obligation relating to the use of a natural resource or the prevention or
abatement of an environmental interference.
2. In particular, it shall:
(a) cease the internationally wrongful act;
(b) as far as possible, re-establish the situation which would have existed if
the internationally wrongful act had not taken place;
(c) provide compensation for the harm which results from the international-
ly wrongful act;
(d) where appropriate, give satisfaction for the internationally wrongful act.
I& (citing WORLD CO1MMISSION ON ENvIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPERTS




162. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 927-35 (analyzing treaties applicable to destruc-
tion of environment during wartime).
163. United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hos-
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Geneva Convention of 1949 (Protocol I). Iraq is a party to ENMOD,
which prohibits engagement "in military ... environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the
means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other State Party."'65
Similarly, Protocol I fortifies the provision of the Geneva Convention
of 1949'" which makes the destruction of property illegal in the ab-
sence of military necessity. Protocol I prohibits "methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment."'67 Conse-
quently, Iraq's actions with respect to the oil well fires and oil spills
would most likely satisfy the terms of Protocol I if Iraq had been a
party to the Convention.'"
Although both conventions are worded similarly, they cover different
types of relationships.'69 ENMOD governs the use of environmental
tile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333
(entered into force Oct. 5, 1978) [hereinafter ENMOD]; see Kelly, supra note 35, at
932-35 (describing in detail the provisions of the ENMOD convention).
164. Protocol I on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7,
1978); see Kelly, supra note 35, at 929-31 (outlining Protocol I's provisions and ap-
plications).
One source also cited to Protocol III to the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Conven-
tion as another current international mechanism to protect the environment. See Sarah
Lee, A Geneva Convention for the Environment, SOLIC. J., Mar. 29, 1991, at 386
(listing four Geneva Conventions' provisions to protect the environment).
165. ENMOD, supra note 163, art. 1.1. ENMOD defines "environmental modifica-
tion techniques" as "any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation
of natural processes-the dynamics . . . of the Earth . . . ." Id. art. II.
166. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
of 1949] (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950). Article 53 states: "[A]ny destruction by
the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collective-
ly to private persons, or to the State . . . is prohibited, except where such destruction
is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." Id. For an excellent analysis
of article 53 and the military necessity exception of article 23(g) of the Hague Con-
vention for Regulations, which prohibits the destruction of enemy property, see
Zedalis, supra note 15.
167. Protocol I, supra note 164, art. 35.3.
168. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 931 (citing examples of the destruction caused
by Iraq to meet the threshold of Protocol I).
169. See Ken Schafer, The Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed
Conflict and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Con-
duct Are Permissible During Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. L. REv. 287, 312 (1989) (dis-
tinguishing between international laws of armed conflict and of environmental protec-
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modification techniques between or among its signatories or State Par-
ties, whereas Protocol I controls any method of warfare intended to
cause environmental damage between or among any warring nations.'7"
As a result, Protocol I seems more directly applicable to the Gulf
War."7 Nevertheless, the provision presently lacks authority enforce-
able against Iraq, which is not a party to the Convention. n
b. Customary Law
Under customary international warfare law, the Hague Conventions of
1899'1' and 1907 74 are applicable. Formerly sources of conventional
law, they became binding sources of customary law following World
War U." The Hague Conventions were designed to "humanize" war
practices and proscribed a broader range of behavior than the earlier
restrictions, which focused primarily on eliminating the use of poisonous
substances. 76
By 1977, an additional protocol was ratified to prohibit the destruc-
tion of "useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as ... drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works ... ."" If Iraq were a party to the convention, this
tion, favoring stronger protection of the environment).
170. ld.
171. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 930 (suggesting that the Gulf War destruction
meets the threshold requirements of Protocol I).
172. Kelly, supra note 35, at 931 (noting that Iraq was not a party to the con-
vention).
173. See Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War by Land, (Hague
I1), July 29, 1899 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899], reprinted in DIEI'UAH
SCHINDLER & JMn TOMAN, THE LAW OF ARtID CONFLICTS. 63. 91 (1988) (describ-
ing the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1899).
174. Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV),
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 55 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 19071.
175. See Falk, supra note 143, at 42. The Nuremberg Trials prosecuted military
officials for war crimes committed during World War H1. Id. The international tribunal
held that the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 had "the force of customary
law-binding even on non-signatory States." Id. (noting Hague Conventions surpassed
previous "orbit of consent"); see infra notes 188, 194-97 and accompanying text (re-
visiting purpose of Nuremberg Trials to prosecute Saddam Hussein).
176. See Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, supra notes 173 and 174 (apply-
ing international warfare law to human rights).
177. Protocol 1I Addition to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1978); see also Waldemar A. Sol, Protection of Civil-
1994] 515
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
protocol could apply to the damage inflicted on the desalination facili-
ties, which produce most of the potable water in the region.'
This cursory view of applicable and potentially applicable international
laws leads one to the conclusion that the present framework lacks speci-
ficity and authority to hold a nation such as Iraq liable for its aggressive
environmental destruction rendered during wartime.'79 Moreover, the
U.N. Security Council's attempt to finalize the hostilities of the Persian
Gulf War' 0 in Resolution 687"' illuminates the dire need for the
current system's reform. Resolution 687 alone cannot reconcile the
vague and incomplete legal provisions discussed above to prevent this
type of environmental devastation from recurring.'
Some commentators argue that Resolution 687 fails to hold Saddam
Hussein personally liable for the destruction he ordered,' 3 while others
assert that it recognizes only the short-term cost of the war to the
region.' The next section highlights some of the proposals to remedy
ians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law Under Pro-
tocol I, I AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 133-34 (1986) (confirming Protocol II as
a source of customary international law).
178. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing desalination plants af-
fected by the dumping of oil into the Persian Gulf); see also Kelly, supra note 35, at
931 n.58 (noting vital role of desalination facilities).
179. See Falk, supra note 143, at 33-51 (proposing a "convention on ecocide" to
criminalize environmental destruction). Provisions in international agreements that pe-
nalize environmental offenders should be broad enough to serve their purpose. Sanford
E. Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Liability: Can Developments in
Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse? 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 314 (1989).
180. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 939-43 (summarizing the U.N.'s actions prior to
and throughout the Persian Gulf War).
181. U.N. SCOR Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991) [hereinafter Resolution 687]. Resolution 687 makes Iraq accountable for "any
direct loss, [or] damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources . . . as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait." Id.
The U.N. Security Council also established a fund to collect 25% of Iraq's revenues
from annual oil sales in order to compensate claims against Iraq for destruction of
Kuwaiti property. Id. at 18.
182. Id.
183. See Matthew Nimetz & Gidon Caine, Crimes Against Nature, AMICUS J.,
Summer 1991, at 9 (proposing leaders should be charged as war criminals for deliber-
ately polluting environment).
184. See U.S. Trade Mission Pushes Debt-Nature Swaps, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. Cur-
rent Rep. No. 13, at 377 (July 3, 1991) (citing International Green Cross' fundraising
effort to "pursue charges against Iraq's President Saddam Hussein for having willfully
set afire hundreds of oil wells"); United Nations Establishes Compensation Commis-
sion for Iraqi War Damages, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., June 1991, at 8 (discussing
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the current system's failure to handle these issues adequately and force-
fully18 5
B. LEGAL PROPOSALS TO REMEDY THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Three leading proposals address the urgent need within the interna-
tional community to deter and punish environmental terrorists." After
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each, this Comment concludes
with some recommendations to achieve these ends.
1. International Criminal Court
Some commentators advocate the establishment of an international
criminal court to try perpetrators of crimes that violate standards held by
the international community." The environmental destruction of the
Persian Gulf War would be included as a crime for which Saddam
Hussein could be tried in the international criminal court."5
The international criminal court could be fashioned after four possible
models: (1) a permanent court to which nations would surrender their
individual sovereignty; (2) a temporary international court whereby vic-
tors carry out trials and then disband the court; (3) a limited internation-
lack of procedural rules for administering claims).
185. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 122, at 386 (proposing that a fifth Geneva Con-
vention address environmental harm caused by any military power): Alan E. Boyle,
Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J. INT'L L 347, 371
(1985) (urging more comprehensive marine pollution laws); William Walker, Canada
Urges 'Eco-Terrorism' lawv, TORONTO STAR, July 11, 1991, at A13 (reporting
Canada's call for a strict international law to prohibit 'eco-terrorism').
186. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (making recommendations for
future international legal mechanisms that would deter military forces from unreason-
ably harming the environment); see also Walker, supra note 185, at A13 (reporting
Canada's call for a strict international law to prohibit 'eco-terrorism').
187. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 21 (statement of Mr. Woetzel) (discuss-
ing the viability of an international criminal court). Present at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing were Robert Woetzel, President, Foundation for the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court; Anthony D'Amato. Professor of Inter-
national Law, Northwestern University; and Senators Jesse Helms, Christopher Dodd,
Claiborne Pell, Paul Simon, Charles Robb, and Mitch McConnell. Id. at 1.
188. ld. (statement of Senator Pell); see also Tony Mauro, U.S. Building Case for
Post-War Trials, GANNETT NEws SERvIcE, Feb. 13, 1991 (indicating that U.S. offi-
cials were collecting information for prosecuting Saddam Hussein in Nuremberg-style
war trials after the Persian Gulf War).
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al court founded upon Islamic principles to try defendants from Islamic
nations; and (4) a United States national court to prosecute war crimi-
nals under U.S. laws, as was the case with Japanese war criminals fol-
lowing World War II."19
While the first model, the permanent international criminal court,
should ideally be the proper forum to handle prosecutions at the interna-
tional level, it assumes that countries would be willing to surrender their
sovereignty to a higher forum."9 The U.N. has tried a similar approach
via the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but the court's decisions
have been criticized heavily by the United States and developing coun-
tries. 9' Questions of who would be proper judges and where the fo-
rum would be held would also have to be addressed."9 Given the cur-
rent number of international conflicts, the world is not yet capable of
managing this kind of system. 93
The second model, the special international court, may be more prom-
ising because sovereignty issues are not involved to the same extent)9
Nevertheless, the role of the victors as conductors of the trials has prov-
en troublesome for some commentators, who assert that the victors will
not serve justice blindly. 9 It should be noted here that the Nuremberg
trials initially generated similar controversy, but have since become
regarded as established precedent."
189. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 16 (statement of Senator Helms) (outlin-
ing choices for an international criminal court arrangement).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 17 (statement of Mr. D'Amato).
192. Id. at 26-27 (statements of Mr. D'Amato and Mr. Woetzel).
193. See A Survey of Defence in the 21st Century, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1992, at
3-5 [hereinafter Survey] (discussing the large number of wars of interest and wars of
conscience currently plaguing the planet).
194. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 16 (statement of Senator Helms) (com-
paring the function of a temporary court to that of the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war
criminals).
195. See id., at 26 (statement of Mr. D'Amato) (asserting that justice would be
inhibited unless a general consensus among the leaders of nations existed on the ac-
ceptable international norms of behavior). An international court should prosecute only
substantial deviations from generally accepted international norms. Id.
196. See id., at 17 (statement of Mr. D'Amato) (reviewing the gradual acceptance
of the Nuremberg prosecution as a solid and entrenched precedent); id. at 26 (state-
ment of Mr. D'Amato) (arguing that an international prosecution of Iraqi leaders
would be fair in consideration of the fact that the international court would be apply-
ing the same law Iraq adopted over thirty years ago).
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The third model, an Islamic court for trying Islamic offenders, ac-
knowledges possible prejudice against non-Western defendants in West-
em courts.' 97 The United States, however, argues that the educational
impact of the trial would be diminished if only a regional group of
judges were permitted to carry out the war crimes inquiry."
The fourth model, a U.S. national war crimes court, appeases con-
cerns that the world will not witness the prosecution of the war crimi-
nals, but also raises questions of sovereignty." Is the U.S. criminal
justice system the appropriate arena in which to try international crimi-
nals?
These models each offer a fresh perspective on handling the volatile
issue of whether to prosecute war criminals, and if so, how. Of the four
examples, the temporary international court seems most logical in the
sense that its purpose is clear: the court is established only to prosecute
perpetrators of crimes in a war that has just been waged. In order to
avoid charges of imperialism or ethnocentrism, the war crimes trials
should be held in a neutral country removed both politically and geo-
graphically from the warring nations. The U.N. should select the loca-
tion as well as the judges from nations with excellent human rights re-
cords.'
2. The International Green Cross/Green Crescent
Another innovative proposal to remedy the current international sys-
tem is the establishment of the International Green Cross/Green Crescent
for the protection of the environment during time of war and natural
disaster." Just as the International Red Cross protects civilians during
197. See id. at 16 (statement of Senator Helms) (preferring as more equitable an
Islamic court for Islamic offenders).
198, See id., at 12 (statement of Dr. Wiesel) (stating that violations of internation-
al standards of conduct should be tried in the dramatic setting of an international
court).
199. See it, at 17 (statement of Mr. D'Amato) (arguing that an international court
would not affect United States sovereignty because the U.S. adheres to the law the
court would be applying).
200. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 944-45 & n.134 (suggesting that the U.N.
should have brought Iraq to trial for the damage it caused to the environment).
Bringing Iraq to trial would have served both as a general deterrent of war and as a
partial remedy for the war's victims, lId; see also Hearings Ill, supra note 120. at 18
(statement of Mr. D'Amato) (proposing that bringing such charges against Iraqi lead-
ers could generate positive steps to protect the environment, just as the Nuremberg
trials brought about an advancement of human rights causes).
201. See Watts, supra note 121, at 3 (recounting the meeting which proposed an
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wartime and the Red Crescent mobilizes to provide disaster relief, the
mission of the International Green Cross/Green Crescent is to address
both causes of environmental degradation." 2 Once environmental dam-
age is assessed, the Green Cross will forward its recommendations to an
independent tribunal responsible for determining the punishment and
reparations necessary to address the harm suffered by the environment,
war's "forgotten victim."'a 3
Similar to the special international court, the Green Cross and its
recommendations will face resistance.2" Nations distrustful of the kinds
of recommendations made and reparations imposed would most likely
defy the Green Cross and the tribunal.2 5
The Green Cross does, however, offer an advantage over the court
systems mentioned above." After initial opposition or reluctance, na-
tions may better understand the need to protect the environment from
wartime damage, especially when considering the lingering effects of the
Persian Gulf War." The Green Cross could also be effective in con-
International Green Cross to provide permanent representation for environmental con-
cerns throughout the international community). The meeting was organized by the
London School of Economics, the Defence Research Society, and Greenpeace. Id.
Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is now the president of the Interna-
tional Green Cross/Green Crescent, a private organization established in April 1993 to
coordinate global environmental initiatives. See Michael Wines, Capitol Stirs To Mr.
Green, NJ Gorbachev, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at AIO (discussing Gorbachev's
role in promoting the organization's mission); Eugene Linden, Gorby-Moving from
the Cold War to Global Warming, the Former Soviet Leader Searches for a New
Role, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 52 (focusing on the organization's efforts to address
environmental issues worldwide under the leadership of Gorbachev).
202. Watts, supra note 121, at 3; see International Green Cross Outlines First
Series of Environmental Programs, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Feb. 17, 1994), available
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (summarizing the formation and implemen-
tation of the "Green Cross" concept).
203. Watts, supra note 121, at. 3.
204. See Greenpeace News Conference, supra note 118 (reporting that the United
States caused much of the environmental destruction, and concluding that both the
Americans and the Iraqis were responsible for unacceptable harm to the environment).
205. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 37 (noting that the United States and
third world countries evade the rule of law under the ICJ because the court has a
history of inhibiting the range of action available for reacting to perceived threats).
206. See Greenpeace News Conference, supra note 118 (describing the early oppo-
sition of Greenpeace to the Persian Gulf War on the grounds that the environmental
damage would be unacceptable). Greenpeace was severely criticized for opposing a
necessary war. Id.
207. See Cooke, supra note 46, at 55 (stating that the plume of sooty-smoke from
the burning oil wells would reach from New York to Florida).
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junction with the provisions of a fifth Geneva Convention, discussed in
the next section.
3. A Fifth Geneva Convention on the Environmemt
At the present time, four Geneva Conventions establish a framework
to secure human rights during wartime.' These conventions, however,
afford the environment few protections."' As a result, many groups
urge the meeting of a fifth Geneva Convention to provide a legal frame-
work for global environmental protection"
The fifth Geneva Convention would address concerns stemming from
the preceding Geneva Conventions as well as the dire need to protect
the environment during wartime."' One of the major weaknesses of
the earlier Geneva Conventions, the military exception, which allows
punishable actions to be forgiven by law, is not permitted in the pro-
posed fifth Convention." Proponents recommend including the follow-
ing objectives:
(1) to ensure application of the rules to all forms of armed conflict;
(2) to outlaw the use of the environment as a weapon;
(3) to curtail the incidental environmental damage resulting from mili-
tary force; and
(4) to forbid environmental damage to third party nations, internation-
al waters, and the atmosphere. 4
The theories behind a fifth Geneva Convention are deterrence and
punishment."5 If a strong international legal framework is in place,
208. See Watts, supra note 121, at 3 (suggesting that the Green Cross could work
effectively under the terms of a fifth Geneva Convention on the environment).
209. See JOSEPH MODFE SWEENEY ET At., THE INTERNATiONAL LEGAL SYSrM
742-44, 758, 760-61 (3d ed. 1988) (describing the Geneva Conventions).
210. See part IV. section A above (outlining current laws to protect the environ-
ment during war).
211. See Lee, supra note 122, at 386 (outlining the provisions of a convention
dedicated to environmental protection); Greenpeace News Conference, supra note 118
(providing an overview of the Persian Gulf War's environmental atrocities); Amanda
Brown, Call to Make Environmental Destruction a War Crime, PRESS Assoc.
NEWSFILE, June 3, 1991 (classifying environmental destruction as a punishable war
crime).
212. See Lee, supra note 122, at 386 (noting that the current four Geneva Con-
ventions define acceptable limits for violations of human rights during war but do not
define similar limits for damage to the environment).
213. Id
214. Id.
215. See Michael Binyon, Plan to Save Environment, TIMES. Mar. 14. 1991 (dis-
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potential violators may be deterred from using the environment as a
weapon, particularly if the leader(s) will be prosecuted for war
crimes.2 '6 Furthermore, if the threat of prosecution does not prevent the
act, the punishment inflicted may serve as a general deterrent, notifying
potential violators that behavior deplorable to the international commu-
nity will not go unchecked." 7 Above all, a fifth Geneva Convention
would symbolize the international community's intolerance for and soli-
darity against environmental terrorism." 8
CONCLUSION
After assessing the current international legal framework and proposed
remedies, the soundest conclusion is that the U.N. and its agencies must
be allowed to play a more forceful role in resolving disputes and negoti-
ating settlements between warring neighbors before the environmental
atrocities of the Persian Gulf War are repeated elsewhere. With the U.N.
as mediator, perhaps the nations of the world will come to view war-
fare, particularly against the environment, as the least desirable means to
achieve their objectives." 9
Given the current number of conflicts throughout the world, however,
that vision is not yet a reality. Until war becomes obsolete, international
as well as intranational conflicts will continue to consume valuable
human and environmental resources 20 To prevent the kind of devasta-
tion that occurred during the six weeks of the Persian Gulf War, an ad
hoc and independent international tribunal should be given the authority
cussing several incidents involving environmental destruction and reviewing the weak-
nesses in the current Geneva Conventions).
216. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 2-3 (statement of Senator McConnell)
(suggesting that Saddam Hussein be punished as a war criminal for the deliberate
environmental destruction he caused).
217. Id., at 3 (asserting that punishing Iraqi leaders would deter other leaders from
developing fiscal plans based on aggression against neighboring countries).
218. See Lee, supra note 122, at 386 (noting that the terms "ecocide" and "envi-
ronmental terrorism" first appeared in military jargon during the Persian Gulf War).
219. See Bruce W. Nelan, How the World Will Look in 50 Years, TIME, Fall
1992, at 36 (predicting that war will become "essentially irrelevant" for democratic
nations in future decades); Survey, supra note 193, at 22 (concluding that the future
military challenges for democracies will consist of maintaining an efficient common
defense force to control any despotic regimes).
220. See Nelan, supra note 219, at 36 (suggesting that decision makers in the
democracies will avoid warfare as too costly).
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to prosecute environmental terrorists and to impose the harshest sanc-
tions and sentences against them."2
Ultimately, an international agreement such as a fifth Geneva Conven-
tion2 should be drafted to provide a more permanent body of law up-
on which the international community could rely for guidance; the cur-
rent international legal framework is vague and unenforceable in envi-
ronmental matters. If deterrence and punishment are the most critical
underpinnings of an effective international criminal justice system m a
fifth Geneva Convention would be a proactive remedy, providing both
predictability in enforcement and severity in punishment. To prevent
future acts of environmental terrorism, the international legal community
must provide a more comprehensive and predictable system of resolving
conflicts, providing remedies, and prosecuting war criminals.'
221. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 23 (statement of Mr. Wotzel) (noting
the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of ad hoc international courts for trying war crim-
inals).
222. See Lee, supra note 122, at 386 (advising that the international community
next agree on the definitions for intolerable abuses of the environment). If nations
would agree, a fifth Geneva Convention would provide the legal basis for deterring
and punishing international environmental crimes. See id. (proposing general agree-
ments to enforce a limit on the environmental impact of any armed conflict).
223. See id. at 386 (proposing that an international system for deterring and pun-
ishing environmental crimes derives from general agreements to enforce limits on
military actions).
224. See Hearings III, supra note 120, at 25 (indicating the urgent need to pro-
mote "responsibility and accountability" for nations and individuals). The legal fiction
of the "nation-state" should not provide protection for irresponsible actions that lead
to irreparable harms. Id.
1994"1
